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ABSTRACT
In a time where the international community seems unable or
unwilling to commit to binding instruments to solve global-governance issues, ranging from climate to cybercrime, increased
reliance on customary norms presents a path forward. Using the
case of space traffic, this author investigates if and how customary international law can emerge to govern complex transnational issues. The traditional approach to international custom
is augmented with perspectives from the broader field of social
science to accord for the influence of private actors and technological development on the formation of customary law.
Commercialization of the space sector has unleashed a tremendous proliferation of satellites in the orbits of Earth. Without globally aligned “rules of the road” for the orbital highways,
the collective human space activities are on an unsustainable
path towards congestion, competition, and rapidly increasing
collision risk. In lieu of an elusive treaty solution, binding rules
of the road for space may emerge through customary international law.
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INTRODUCTION

R

ULE OF THE ROAD has been defined as “a customary
practice (such as driving always on a particular side of the
road or yielding the right of way) developed in the interest of
safety and often subsequently reinforced by law. [E]specially: any
of the rules making up a code governing ships in matters relating to mutual safety.”1
Humankind, as a spacefaring civilization, urgently needs to
figure out how to coordinate and govern traffic in the orbits
around our home planet. Drastic reductions in launch cost,2
miniaturization of satellites,3 and commercialization of the
space industry4 are lowering the barriers to spacefaring. As a result, the quantity and diversity of human space activities are rising at an unprecedented pace.5 The orbital domain is about to
become much more crowded with mega-constellations of
1 Rule of the Road, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rule%20of%20the%20road [https://perma.cc/RM63-GL4C].
2 See Harry W. Jones, The Recent Large Reduction in Space Launch Cost, at 1–7,
48th Int’l Conf. on Env’t Sys., Doc. ICES-2018-81 (July 8, 2018), https://ttuir.tdl.org/bitstream/handle/2346/74082/ICES_2018_81.pdf [https://
perma.cc/FV5N-7YV2].
3 See Martin N. Sweeting, Modern Small Satellites—Changing the Economics of
Space, 106 PROC. IEEE 343, 347–53 (2018).
4 See Matt Weinzierl & Mehak Sarang, The Commercial Space Age Is Here, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Feb. 12, 2021), https://hbr.org/2021/02/the-commercial-space-ageis-here [https://perma.cc/G2M7-9HEQ].
5 See id.
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thousands of satellites,6 space tourism,7 and private space stations8 adding to the already-increasing activities of nation-states.
Due to the rapid expansion of space activity in Low Earth Orbit
(LEO),9 there is a need for common rules of the road to avoid
congestion and collisions. The growing urgency of instituting
better governance of space traffic is widely recognized by nations,10 industry,11 and academia.12
The governance of traffic in space is generally discussed
under the term “space traffic management,” which refers to
both regulatory and technical tools aimed at ensuring the sustainability and safety of current and future space traffic.13 Developments in both technical capabilities and regulation are
needed for a functional, holistic space traffic management sys6 See Theodore J. Muelhaupt, Marlon E. Sorge, Jamie Morin & Robert S. Wilson, Space Traffic Management in the New Space Era, 6 J. SPACE SAFETY ENG’G 80, 80
(2019).
7 See Adam Mann, Space Is All Yours—for a Hefty Price, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 21,
2022), https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/02/21/1044909/commericalspace-tourism-cost/ [https://perma.cc/PXD9-TX7B].
8 See Justin St. P. Walsh & Alice Gorman, Private Space Stations Are Coming. Will
They Be Better than Their Predecessors?, CONVERSATION (Dec. 5, 2021, 2:12 PM),
http://theconversation.com/private-space-stations-are-coming-will-they-be-betterthan-their-predecessors-170871 [https://perma.cc/Z9B4-2UNU].
9 See Carmen Pardini & Luciano Anselmo, Evaluating the Impact of Space Activities in Low Earth Orbit, 184 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 11, 11 (2021); Aaron C. Boley &
Michael Byers, Satellite Mega-Constellations Create Risks in Low Earth Orbit, the Atmosphere and on Earth, 11 SCI. REPS. 1, 1–2 (2021); Andy Lawrence et al., The Case for
Space Environmentalism, 6 NATURE ASTRONOMY 428, 428–29 (2022).
10 See, e.g., Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy,
83 Fed. Reg. 28969, 28969–74 (June 21, 2018) (using strong wording in the
Space Policy Directive); Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the
Council: An EU Approach for Space Traffic Management, at 1-4, COM (2022) 4 final
(Feb. 15, 2022) [hereinafter EC Joint Communication] (recognizing an urgent
need for a space traffic management system).
11 The Satellite Industry Association, which represents many of the world’s
largest private satellite operators, is pushing for better space traffic management
on behalf of its members. See Theresa Hitchens, SIA Calls for Space Traffic Rules
ASAP, BREAKING DEF. (Sep. 24, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2020/09/sia-calls-for-space-traffic-rules-asap/
[https://perma.cc/ZR5W-CMFK].
12 See Corinne Contant-Jorgenson, Petr Lála & Kai-Uwe Schrogl, The IAA Cosmic
Study on Space Traffic Management, 22 SPACE POL’Y 283, 283–85 (2006); William H.
Ailor, Space Traffic Management: Implementations and Implications, 58 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 279, 279–86 (2006).
13 See Contant-Jorgenson et al., supra note 12, at 284 (“Space traffic management means the set of technical and regulatory provisions for promoting safe
access into outer space, operations in outer space and return from outer space to
Earth free from physical or radio-frequency interference.”).
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tem to emerge.14 This Article focuses exclusively on available avenues for a legal basis for the emergence of required regulation.
The core of the regulatory side of space traffic management
consists of the substantive traffic rules regulating the interactions and coordination between traffic actors in space, commonly referred to as “rules of the road.”15 Historically, norms
have emerged across human traffic domains in response to increased activity, collision risk, and congestion.16 From the informal norm of standing to the right on an escalator, to the
formalized rules governing traffic on roads, at sea, and in airspace, rules of the road play an essential role in creating a safe,
efficient, and predictable environment for traffic participants.17
The need for common norms and predictable behavior to avoid
collisions in space is widely recognized, but there is little agreement to be found about what the actual rules or norms should
be.18 In addition, avoidance maneuvers have costs in terms of
precious fuel and lost mission time, and operators will therefore
usually prefer having the right-of-way.19 Rules of the road are
needed to avoid scenarios where operators essentially “play
chicken”20 with satellites to avoid the economic burden of
maneuvering.

14 See P.J. Blount, Space Traffic Coordination: Developing a Framework for Safety and
Security in Satellite Operations, 2021 SPACE: SCI. & TECH. 1, 2–3 (2021), https://
spj.sciencemag.org/journals/space/2021/9830379/ [https://perma.cc/2J3ZFJQ6].
15 See Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Space Traffic Management: The New Comprehensive Approach for Regulating the Use of Outer Space—Results from the 2006 IAA Cosmic Study,
62 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 272, 274 (2008); Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management
Standards, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 359, 361 (2018).
16 See Hjalte Osborn Frandsen, Looking for the Rules-of-the-Road of Outer Space: A
Search for Basic Traffic Rules in Treaties, Guidelines and Standards, 9 J. SPACE SAFETY
ENG’G 231, 232–33 (2022).
17 See id. at 232.
18 See id.
19 See The Cost of Avoiding Collisions, EUR. SPACE AGENCY [ESA] (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2021/02/
The_cost_of_avoiding_collision [https://perma.cc/Y95M-W97N] (providing an
infographic to demonstrate the cost of maneuvering).
20 The “game of chicken” is a model of conflict for two players in game theory.
In the most basic version of the game, two cars are driving on a collision course
and whoever swerves first loses the game. Of course, if none of the drivers swerve,
the result is a fatal collision. For a deeper look at the history and application of
the concept, see WILLIAM POUNDSTONE, PRISONER’S DILEMMA 197–201 (1st ed.
1992).
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Autonomous collision avoidance is frequently touted as the
solution to the issue of growing congestion in orbit.21 However,
although autonomous systems will likely be integral to traffic
safety, they do not dispense with the need for aligned rules of
the road.22 Like human operators, algorithms must be able to
predict the actions of other traffic actors to successfully plan and
execute avoidance maneuvers.23 Even in a hypothetical future
scenario with flawless automation and information sharing,
rules of the road would be needed to allocate priority and rightof-way.24
To complicate matters further, a traffic regime must apply to
all or most space actors and be adequately harmonized globally
to be effective.25 Therefore, to solve the issue of safe space traffic, one must venture beyond the legal order of the nation-state
and into the domain of public international law.26 The management of traffic and debris in Earth’s orbits thus becomes an issue of global governance, with the implied difficulties and
complexities.27 The investigation in this Article concerns potential avenues for globally aligned orbital rules of the road to
emerge in the future.
In the growing body of legal literature discussing the future of
space traffic management and rules of the road, the focus has
mostly been on binding law originating from the original or new
space treaties or on various forms of soft-law instruments, guidelines, and standards.28 Customary international law, another primary source of international law, has received much less
21 See Kerianne L. Hobbs, Alexander R. Collins & Eric M. Feron, Towards a
Taxonomy for Automatic and Autonomous Cooperative Spacecraft Maneuvering in a Space
Traffic Management Framework 1, 3 (2020) (presented at ASCEND 2020 virtual
conference).
22 See MAUI ECON. DEV. BD., OTR 2022-00292, SSA/STM AMOS WORKSHOP 3
(2021), https://amostech.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/2021-AMOSSSA_STM-Data-Operator-Exchange-Workshop-Key-Findings.pdf [https://
perma.cc/L5TG-SDJ] (identifying the key issue of “[w]ho moves, or who moves
first?” in regards to developing autonomous collision avoidance systems).
23 See Chris Tennant et al., Code, Culture, and Concrete: Self-Driving Vehicles and the
Rules of the Road, FRONTIERS (Nov. 18, 2021), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/frsc.2021.710478/full [https://perma.cc/6QMB-2PBA].
24 See id.
25 See Paul B. Larsen, Profit or Safety: Where Is Outer Space Headed?, 86 J. AIR L. &
COM. 531, 537 (2021).
26 See id.
27 See id.
28 See, e.g., Larsen, supra note 15, at 361–68; Michael P. Gleason, Establishing
Space Traffic Management Standards, Guidelines and Best Practices, 7 J. SPACE SAFETY
ENG’G 426, 427–28 (2020); Schrogl, supra note 15, at 273–74.
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scrutiny even though traffic rules have historically emerged
through international custom in other domains, most notably at
sea.29 The bleak outlook for a multilateral, treaty-based solution
to the issue of space traffic coordination compels us to investigate alternative paths to international governance.
The dearth of binding international solutions is not isolated
to the issue of space traffic. Arguably, the international community’s failure to create binding accords for the most pressing
global challenges of our times, such as climate change30 and
cyber law,31 indicates that the goal of identifying alternatives to
treaty law is a generally applicable one.32 This should not be mistaken for an argument against multilateralism. Historically,
many treaties build upon and formalize principles originally
formed as customary norms.33 Looking to customary norms as a
source for new binding law is not looking away from multilateralism; it is merely recalling that there are other paths leading to
international accord. Since the blossoming of international institutions in the wake of Allied victory in World War II,34 customary international law has seldom been heralded as a viable path
to regulation of new issues facing the international community.35 It may be time to reexamine this ancient source of international law between states that the international community
may come to lean on when treaty solutions seem still more difficult to achieve.
29 See RICHARD BARNES, DAVID FREESTONE & DAVID M. ONG, THE LAW OF THE
SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 13 (4th ed. 2006).
30 See Robert Falkner, A Minilateral Solution for Global Climate Change? On Bargaining Efficiency, Club Benefits, and International Legitimacy, 14 PERSPS. ON POL. 87,
87 (2016).
31 See Kubo Macák, Is the International Law of Cyber Security in Crisis?, 8TH INT’L
CONF. ON CYBER CONFLICT 127, 127–30 (2016).
32 For a general discussion of the failure of the international system in solving
modern global-governance issues, see IAN GOLDIN, DIVIDED NATIONS: WHY
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE IS FAILING, AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 2 (2013);
Thomas Hale, David Held & Kevin Young, Gridlock: From Self-Reinforcing Interdependence to Second-Order Cooperation Problems, 4 GLOB. POL’Y 223, 224–25 (2013);
THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) [hereinafter HALE ET AL., COOPERATION IS FAILING].
33 See, e.g., Bing Bing Jia, The Relations Between Treaties and Custom, 9 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 81, 93–94 (2010).
34 Thomas G. Weiss, The United Nations: Before, During and After 1945, 91 INT’L
AFFS. 1221, 1221 (2015).
35 See Daniel H. Joyner, Why I Stopped Believing in Customary International Law, 9
ASIAN J. INT’L L. 31, 33 (2019).
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The aim of this Article is, accordingly, twofold: (1) to gauge
the potential for space traffic norms to emerge as binding customary law, and (2) to put forward the argument that customary
international law in general may come to play a significant role
in the future governance of global issues. The argument includes premises specific to space law, as well as some that can be
generalized to apply to the broader discussion of the role of custom in modern global-governance issues beyond space law.
Before laying out the main argument, this Article makes a
short account of the issue of debris and congestion in Earth’s
orbits as well as the current legal regime. This is followed by the
main argument of this Article, which is structured in three sections: (1) a doctrinal assessment of the potential for orbital rules
of the road based in customary law, including how and where to
look for evidence of their emergence; (2) an investigation of the
potential for private actors to create or shape emerging customary international law; and (3) a look beyond traditional legal
science at the stages of norm emergence preceding and leading
up to customary law formation. Finally, the conclusion sums up
and integrates the findings.
A.

THE GLOBAL ISSUES

OF

CONGESTION

AND

COLLISION RISK

Artificial satellites are placed in different orbits around Earth
depending on their purpose.36 The orbital space around Earth
is generally categorized into three regions based on altitude:
LEO, Medium Earth Orbit, and Geosynchronous Earth Orbit
(GEO).37 The majority of new satellites are placed in LEO, and
the traffic there is more complex, faster, and less regulated than
in GEO.38 This Article will focus on traffic in LEO, as it is both
the least regulated and the busiest region of orbital space.39 The
issue of overcrowding in LEO is comprised of two separate but
interrelated issues, both of which lead to increased risk of collisions in space: (1) space debris and (2) active-to-active satellite
conjunctions.
See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 429.
Id.
38 For a comparison of the legal regimes governing LEO and GEO, see Alice
Rivière, The Rise of the LEO: Is There a Need to Create a Distinct Legal Regime for Constellations of Satellites?, in 1 LEGAL ASPECTS AROUND SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS 39,
43–49 (Annette Froehlich ed., 2019).
39 See Pardini & Anselmo, supra note 9, at 11.
36
37
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SPACE DEBRIS—AN ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE

Space debris consists of remains of human space activities left
in orbit, such as spent rocket stages, dead satellites, and wreckage from anti-satellite tests.40 The exact quantity of space debris
currently circling Earth is unknown and estimates vary.41 The
European Space Agency (ESA) currently tracks approximately
30,000 debris objects and estimates the total amount of debris in
space to be approximately 130,000,000 objects.42 The size of
debris objects varies from several tons of heavy dead satellites to
minuscule flecks of paint.43 However, even very small objects can
wreak havoc when they travel at velocities of several thousand
kilometers an hour.44 The hazards to astronauts, satellites, and
other space assets posed by space debris have long been recognized as a serious global issue.45 Across the globe, private and
public actors are investing in infrastructure and technology development to improve the identification, characterization, and
tracking of debris.46 In addition, some actors are experimenting
with methods for removing debris,47 but cleaning up space is
difficult and costly.48
40 For background information about space debris, including statistics on the
different sources and types, see About Space Debris, ESA, https://www.esa.int/
Space_Safety/Space_Debris/About_space_debris [https://perma.cc/VAW9ZXQL].
41 For continual updates on space debris population statistics, see Space Debris
by the Numbers, ESA, https://www.esa.int/Safety_Security/Space_Debris/
Space_debris_by_the_numbers#.YY00rRU8KmY.link [https://perma.cc/JL9P2SA7 ] (Aug. 11, 2022).
42 Id.
43 See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., UNOOSA and ESA Space Debris Infographics
and Podcasts (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/informationfor/
media/unoosa-and-esa-release-infographics-and-podcasts-about-space-debris.html
[https://perma.cc/3UBH-6QMQ].
44 See William P. Schonberg, Protecting Spacecraft Against Meteoroid/Orbital Debris
Impact Damage: An Overview, in 1 SPACE DEBRIS 195, 195 (2001).
45 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 62/217, at 2 (Feb. 1, 2008) (noting “space debris is an
issue of concern to all nations,” and endorsing proposed debris mitigation
guidelines).
46 See David Giordano, Space Debris: Another Frontier in the Commercialization of
Space, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (Oct. 31, 2021), https://www.jtl.columbia.edu/
bulletin-blog/space-debris-another-frontier-in-the-commercialization-of-space
[https://perma.cc/XP4T-QM84].
47 For a status on current debris-removal initiatives in 2021, see Leonard David,
Space Junk Removal Is Not Going Smoothly, SCI. AM. (Apr. 14, 2021), https://
www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-junk-removal-is-not-going-smoothly/
[https://perma.cc/UDQ7-7L3T].
48 As debris removal is still experimental, the actual cost of cleaning up space is
unknown. The $102 million price tag for removing a single piece of debris in a
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Technological developments in tracking and removal aside,
the cheapest and safest way to mitigate the issue is to prevent the
generation of debris in the first place.49 Several international initiatives have been created to limit the generation of space debris, such as the widely supported IADC Space Debris
Guidelines50 and the technical standard ISO 24113:2019 Space
Systems—Space Debris Mitigation.51 Although the issue of space
debris is far from fixed, the successful soft-law initiatives and
agreement on technical standards mark the issue as a mature
area of space policy with a relatively high degree of international
collaboration and alignment.52 In GEO orbits, most actors now
conduct their missions in alignment with the debris mitigation
standards, but compliance is much lower in LEO.53 At its core,
debris is an environmental issue, and the aim of regulation is
relatively straightforward: Reduce the amount of junk left in
orbit.54
C.

ACTIVE-TO-ACTIVE SATELLITE CONJUNCTIONS—A TRAFFIC
ISSUE

Compared to the quantity of space debris, the less than 5,000
active satellites in orbit is minuscule.55 Accordingly, most rancontract between ESA and a private party indicates that it will be prohibitively
expensive, even if only large pieces are targeted for removal. See Andy Tomaswick, ESA Is Going to Spend $102 Million to Remove a Single Piece of Space Junk, UNIVERSE TODAY (Nov. 27, 2020), https://www.universetoday.com/148963/esa-isgoing-to-spend-102-million-to-remove-a-single-piece-of-space-junk/ [https://
perma.cc/32JA-U4FB].
49 See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, ORBITAL DEBRIS: A TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT 136
(1995).
50 Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Comm. [IADC], IADC Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines, at 4, IADC-02-01 (Sept. 2007), https://www.unoosa.org/
documents/pdf/spacelaw/sd/IADC-2002-01-IADC-Space_Debris-Guidelines-Revision1.pdf [https://perma.cc/GN78-LH2L].
51 Int’l Org. for Standardization [ISO], Space Systems—Space Debris Mitigation
Requirements, ISO Doc. 24113:2019 (July 2019), https://www.iso.org/standard/
72383.html [https://perma.cc/GGC9-QXXS].
52 See Jennifer Ann Urban, Soft Law: The Key to Security in a Globalized Outer Space,
43 TRANSP. L.J. 33, 46–48 (2016).
53 ESA tracks compliance and developments in behavior. See ESA SPACE DEBRIS
OFF., ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE ENVIRONMENT REPORT 7 (2022).
54 See Mitigation of Orbital Debris in the New Space Age, 85 Fed. Reg. 52422,
52422–23 (Aug. 25, 2020).
55 The NGO Union of Concerned Scientists maintains a record of all operational satellites. See UCS Satellite Database, UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://
www.ucsusa.org/resources/satellite-database [https://perma.cc/7WMJ-UDJS]
(May 1, 2022).
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dom collisions in space happen between pieces of debris, and
the most prominent risk of collision for active satellites is posed
by debris. However, the orbital environment is undergoing
rapid change, with active-to-active satellite encounters becoming
much more frequent due to the rapid expansion of the satellite
population in LEO.56
As the population of active satellites swells, conjunctions between active satellites will develop into a greater risk and be a
common cause for maneuvers.57 Compared to the environmental issue of space debris, active-to-active satellite conjunctions are
a very immature area of policy development without clear, globally accepted norms or standards.58 In simple terms, without better governance, the risk of direct collisions is climbing rapidly in
stride with the growing population of active satellites.59
D.

THE NEED

FOR

UNIFORM, TRANSNATIONAL NORMS

The issues of debris and active-to-active satellite collisions are
intertwined because debris hazards complicate satellite maneuvers and collisions create new clouds of debris.60 Debris reduces
both the safety and the capacity for traffic on the orbital highways.61 Nonetheless, from a regulatory perspective, the issues of
debris and active satellite conjunctions are dissimilar in a fundamental sense. Space debris is an environmental issue that can be
mitigated through national regulation of the design of spacecraft or missions and by requiring operators to conform to
guidelines62 and standards63 in national licensing schemes.64
See Muelhaupt et al., supra note 6, at 81.
See Beyza Unal, Collision Risks in Space Due to Mega-Constellations, CHATHAM
HOUSE (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/10/collision-risksspace-due-mega-constellations [https://perma.cc/V5BY-T84A].
58 See Frandsen, supra note 16, at 237.
59 See Unal, supra note 57.
60 Brian Dunbar & Judy Corbett, Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD),
NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/wstf/site_tour/remote_hypervelocity_test_
laboratory/micrometeoroid_and_orbital_debris.html [https://perma.cc/LF5GBJ7K] (Aug. 6, 2017).
61 See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 430.
62 An example is the Guidelines for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space formally
endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly and recommended for implementation
in national law. See Comm. On The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Guidelines for
the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/
CRP.20, at 2 (2018).
63 An example is the ISO 24113:2019 Space Systems—Space Debris Mitigation
standard, which is referenced in many national legislations. See Sergio Ventura,
56
57
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This type of environmental regulation does not require an international agreement to be effective. Each nation is able to regulate how much polluting debris it will tolerate from its national
actors. The goal of debris mitigation can be reached through
various forms of national or regional regulations, and their effectiveness is not directly impacted by international homogeneity or harmonization of approaches.65 In contrast, the issue of
active-to-active satellite conjunctions cannot be effectively mitigated by unilateral regulation.66 As a systemic coordination issue, active-to-active satellite collision risk can only be mitigated
through transnational, agreed rules of the road, which, as argued below, need to be essentially uniform.67
For rules of the road to deliver safety and efficiency, a large
share of traffic participants must adhere to them with a high
degree of compliance.68 For terrestrial road traffic, the rules of
the road ensure safety, but just as importantly, they also ensure
traffic capacity, speed, and efficiency.69 Cars can travel fast and
close together on motorways in relative safety with minimal coESA Space Debris Mitigation and Re-entry Safety Framework—Status and Novelties, ESA
(Sept. 21, 2021), https://indico.esa.int/event/321/contributions/6330/attachments/4389/6614/
ESA%2520Space%2520Debris%2520Mitigation%2520and%2520Re-entry%2520Safety%2520Regulatory%2520Framework%2520-%2520Status%2520and%2520Novelties%2520%282021%29%2520-%2520Presentation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SCP8-42WH].
64 It is indeed the trend for national space legislations and national authorities
responsible for licensing space activities to require adherence to some form of
space debris mitigation guideline or technical standard. For an overview of how
this requirement has been implemented in each state, see generally U.N. Off. for
Outer Space Affs. [UNOOSA], Compendium of Space Debris Mitigation Standards Adopted by States and International Organizations, https://
www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/topics/space-debris/compendium.html
[https://perma.cc/NM5J-WERJ].
65 See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NATIONAL ORBIT DEBRIS IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN 3–8 (2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/
07-2022-NATIONAL-ORBITAL-DEBRIS-IMPLEMENTATION-PLAN.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/36T2-V7F4].
66 See Unal, supra note 57.
67 See id.
68 In international air law, the need for uniformity in rules of the road is reflected in Annex 2 of the Chicago Convention, containing the “Rules of the Air,”
which is the only Annex that is generally considered implicitly mandatory out of
the Convention’s 18 Annexes. See RUWANTISSA ABEYRATNE, AIR NAVIGATION LAW
69–70 (2012); Int’l Civ. Aviation Org. [ICAO], Annex 2 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation: Rules of the Air, (10th ed. 2005). Likewise, the uniform
application of rules of the road in the law of the sea is considered essential for
their efficiency. See SAMIR MANKABADY, THE LAW OF COLLISION AT SEA 71 (1987).
69 See ABEYRATNE, supra note 68, at 70; Frandsen, supra note 16, at 232.
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ordination because all traffic participants adhere to the same
basic rules. A key advantage of rules of the road is the creation
of a predictable environment for traffic participants. With
shared and uniform rules, each actor can predict the actions of
other actors in the orbital domain based on its knowledge of the
rules, with no requirement of establishing direct communication for each encounter. The need for global uniformity is a
major challenge for regulating space traffic management, as national or even regional rules will not provide much in terms of
predictability and safety when they only apply to a subset of the
traffic actors in orbit.70 Whether based in international law,
alignment of national rules, technical standards, or informal
norms, functional rules of the road require a high degree of
global alignment and acceptance.71 In short, humanity’s space
traffic management regime, including orbital rules of the road,
must have global reach to achieve its purpose.72
II.

THE CURRENT STATE OF REGULATION OF SPACE
TRAFFIC IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The natural starting point for characterizing the international
space traffic regime is international law. At the core of international space law lies the five original space treaties concluded
during the Cold War. When the first of the treaties, the Outer
Space Treaty,73 was passed in 1967, there was a very limited number of spacefaring nations.74 At the time of negotiation of the
Treaty, the focus was on avoiding national appropriation of celestial bodies; preventing the placement of weapons of mass destruction in space; and ensuring the freedom of access,
exploration, and use of outer space for all nations.75 EnvironSee Larsen, supra note 15, at 361.
See Larsen, supra note 25, at 583.
72 Preliminary modeling shows that the unilateral implementation of rules of
the road norms by the United States would reduce the risk of collisions, but
higher compliance would lead to better results. See Mariel Borowitz, Brian C.
Gunter, Megan Birch & Richard J. Macke, An Investigation into Potential Collision
Maneuver Guidelines for Future Space Traffic Management, AMOS § 7 (2021), https:/
/amostech.com/TechnicalPapers/2021/Conjunction-RPO/Borowitz.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2K5P-K2PR].
73 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
74 Alex S. Li, Ruling Outer Space: Defining the Boundary and Determining Jurisdictional Authority, 73 OKLA. L. REV. 711, 715, 717 (2021).
75 See Paul G. Dembling & Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & COM. 419, 427 (1967).
70
71
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mental and traffic issues in space were not yet widely recognized
as important problems to tackle, and debris and traffic regulation are therefore absent from the Outer Space Treaty.76 Ever
since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty, the group of nations with access and interests in space continually has expanded.77 As the number of nations with an interest in and
access to space grew, the task of creating common agreements
with broad support grew ever-more difficult.78
The last of the five original space treaties, the Moon Agreement of 1978,79 was never ratified by any major space power and
is widely considered a failed treaty.80 The failure of the Moon
Agreement is generally seen as a turning point for international
space law because no multilateral treaties with global reach have
been concluded since.81 Instead, soft-law instruments, in the
form of U.N. General Assembly Resolutions,82 guidelines, and
nonbinding principles have been the dominant form of new international space law.83 A growing number of the soft-law instruments are targeted at space sustainability; however, there are, as
of yet, no instruments providing actual, operational rules of the
See Frandsen, supra note 16, at 234.
The expanded state interest is reflected in the membership in the primary
multilateral forum for space matters, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space. Since its inception in 1958 with 18 members, the Committee membership reached 100 states in 2021, making it one of the largest specialized committees in the U.N. system. See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
COPUOUS Membership Evolution, , https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/
ourwork/copuos/members/evolution.html [https://perma.cc/HYJ3-HXBN].
78 See Vladlen S. Vereshchetin & Gennady M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of
International Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 22–23 (1985). Since 1985, the
international community has not come closer to agreeing on any binding laws for
space. See U.N. Off. for Outer Space Affs., Space Law Treaties and Principles,
https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html [https://
perma.cc/MAK9-UQUY] (noting that the last major space treaty was entered into
force in 1984).
79 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3, 18 I.L.M. 1434.
80 See Fabio Tronchetti, The Moon Agreement in the 21st Century: Addressing Its
Potential Role in the Era of Commercial Exploitation of the Natural Resources of the Moon
and Other Celestial Bodies, 36 J. SPACE L. 489, 491–93 (2010).
81 See Stephan Hobe, International Space Law in Its First Half Century, 57th Int’l
Astronautical Cong. 2 (Oct. 2006).
82 For a thorough review of the most important space principles adopted in
U.N. Resolutions, see 3 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW (Stephen Hobe,
Bernhard Schmidt-Tedd & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2015).
83 See Frandsen, supra note 16, at 235.
76
77
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road for space traffic.84 Some authors lament the lack of hard
law in the face of the rapid technological development in
space,85 while others deem soft-law instruments to be useful and
adequate to ensure order in space if further developed.86
In sum, there is a clear need for rules of the road in orbit to
preserve current and future access and use of space. While no
such rules can be found in international space law today, in either soft or hard law, it should be noted that nothing in the
current body of international space law precludes or hinders the
formation of traffic rules in the future, as long as they do not
transgress on the basic principles laid out in the original Outer
Space Treaty, such as the freedom of exploration and use of
outer space.87
It is clearly understood by all major space powers that to retain access to space and to unlock value promised by the host of
ambitious space projects currently being developed all over the
world, we will need rules of the road for orbit, lest the risk of
collision will spiral out of control.88 As argued above, the traffic
rules will need global, binding reach to serve their purpose, and
they have yet to emerge. It is therefore worthwhile to consider
how new international law with general binding force comes
into being.
A.

THE AVENUES

FOR

NEW INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW

Before one can delve into a discussion of the emergence of
international traffic rules in space, a brief review of the foundation of international law is in order. A fundamental difference
between the national legal orders and the international legal system is that the international community is not under the authority of a unified legislature and no international courts have
universal jurisdiction.89 In lieu of a constitutional basis to determine the source of law, Article 38 of the Statute of the Interna84 See Hjalte Osborn Frandsen, Agreeing on the Rules-of-the-Road: Distilling Building Blocks from Proposed Space Traffic Management Treaties, Guidelines and Standards,
72 INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL CONG. § 4.2.2 (2021).
85 See Jack M. Beard, Soft Law’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of
Conduct for Outer Space Activities, 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 335, 352–414 (2017).
86 See Brian Wessel, The Rule of Law in Outer Space: The Effects of Treaties and
Nonbinding Agreements on International Space Law, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMPAR. L.
REV. 289, 314–21 (2012); Urban, supra note 52, at 34–35, 47–49.
87 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. I.
88 See sources cited supra note 10.
89 Malcom Shaw, International Law, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britanni
ca.com/topic/international-law [https://perma.cc/KL8T-5URN].
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tional Court of Justice (ICJ),90 enumerating the sources of
applicable law for the Court, is often referred to when discussing the sources of international law.91 Article 38(1) of the ICJ
Statute lists three primary sources of international law: treaties,
customs, and general principles.92 Although the weight of the
analysis here is on international custom, the potential for rules
to emerge through the two other major sources, treaties and
general principles, will be briefly touched upon to justify the focus on custom.
Since the conclusion of World War II, the bulk of new international law has been created through treaties and conventions
negotiated and concluded by states.93 In the field of space law,
academics have discussed various forms of treaty-based, multilateral space traffic regimes over the years.94 However, an international space traffic management treaty or convention seems
unlikely in the near term. States have been unwilling to commit
beyond soft law in space for decades, and the consensus among
academics is that no treaty is forthcoming.95 Several factors conspire to make a treaty seem implausible, including the need to
get a large and growing group of spacefaring nations to agree,96
cold air between the major space powers,97 and the growing
securitization98 and militarization99 of space. The failure of
treaty-borne multilateralism over the last five decades has been
especially palpable in the space domain, but some authors
90 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1031, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
91 GLEIDER HERNÁNDEZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW 34 (2d ed. 2022).
92 Id.
93 See id. at 41; Martti Koskenniemi, History of International Law, Since World War
II, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/
9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e714 [https://perma.cc/649H-ZBSB] (June
2011).
94 See Larsen, supra note 15, at 367–68, 384–87; Contant-Jorgenson et al., supra
note 12, at 286–87; Ailor, supra note 12, at 281–86.
95 See Sophie Goguichvili, Alan Linenberger, Amber Gillette & Alexandra Novak, The Global Legal Landscape of Space: Who Writes the Rules on the Final Frontier,
WILSON CTR. (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/global-legallandscape-space-who-writes-rules-final-frontier [https://perma.cc/2XUT-V95M];
Frandsen, supra note 16, at 235 n.20.
96 See Goguichvili et al., supra note 95.
97 See id.
98 See Columba Peoples, The Securitization of Outer Space: Challenges for Arms Control, 32 CONTEMP. SEC. POL’Y 76, 80 (2011).
99 Arne Sönnichsen, Militarization and Securitization of Outer Space, in A RSCH.
AGENDA FOR SPACE POL’Y 89, 89–96 (Kai-Uwe Schrogl, Christina Giannopapa &
Ntorina Antoni eds., 2021).

2022]

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

721

would argue that it represents a general trend in international
relations.100
The “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”
listed in Article 38(1)(c) of the IJC Statute refer to basic legal
principles, such as “good faith” or “impartiality of judges,” that
have migrated from the national legal orders and have become
universal to law.101 Although the general principles of international law can certainly have an impact on a future space traffic
regime, through concepts such as the requirement for international law to be equitable, the principles are more helpful for
judges in applying the often-incoherent body of international
law, rather than providing specific rules.102 Rules of the road
provisions for orbit fall outside of the category of general principles of international law, and we therefore have to look to the
remaining primary source of international law, international
custom.
III.

ASSESSMENT OF CUSTOM AS A BASIS FOR ORBITAL
TRAFFIC RULES

Customary international law refers to binding obligations arising from international established practices, and it binds states
independently from treaties and other formalized obligations.103
Rules of the road across various domains, from sea to roads,
have roots in custom.104 In this Part, it will be argued that customary international law presents a conceivable path to the creation of an international space traffic regime. Specifically, this
Part will highlight the historical precedents of custom in space
law and traffic regulation in general, the ability of customary
100 See Harlan Grant Cohen, Multilateralism’s Life Cycle, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 47
(2018); Jutta Brunnée, Multilateralism in Crisis, 112 PROC. ASIL ANN. MEETING
335, 336–39 (2018); see also GOLDIN, supra note 32, at 1–10; HALE ET AL., COOPERATION IS FAILING, supra note 32, passim.
101 ICJ Statute, supra note 90, art. 38(1)(c); see also General Principles of Law,
INT’L LEGAL RSCH. INST., https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/cust_law_10.htm#:~:text=Examples%20of%20these%20general%20principles,other%20sources%20of%20international%20law [https://perma.cc/ZV9Z-4YQP].
102 See Michael Akehurst, Equity and General Principles of Law, 25 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 801, 807–08, 813–14 (1976).
103 See JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, MONICA HAKIMI, STEVEN RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESSES 63–64 (Rachel E. Barkow et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2020).
104 See John King Gamble, Jr. & Maria Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and
Customary Law of the Sea: Observations, a Framework, and a Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 491, 491–92 (1984); Lon L. Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, 14 AM. J.
JURIS. 1, 11–13 (1969).
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norms to emerge between geopolitical adversaries, the fact that
customary rules are by definition internationally aligned, and,
finally, the notion that specific customary rules can emerge to
govern fast-moving issues in a timely manner.
A.

THE CENTRAL ROLE

OF

CUSTOMARY LAW

IN

SPACE

Customary international law has, from the beginning of the
space age, constituted an important element in the international regulation of space.105 ICJ judge and esteemed space law
scholar Manfred Lachs argued that the fundamental principles
laid down in the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the
Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1963,106 became binding international custom, even before the international community enshrined the same principles in the binding Outer Space
Treaty of 1967.107 It is the general consensus among space law
scholars that several of the principles laid down in the Declaration and affirmed by the Outer Space Treaty, such as the principles of non-appropriation and freedom of access, exploration,
and use, have customary law status today and thus bind all
nations.108
B.

THE CUSTOMARY ROOTS

OF

TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

Looking beyond space law, customary traffic rules have historically emerged in response to issues of growing traffic and later
been transformed into hard law.109 Specifically, the law of the
sea is often the analogy of choice for space, legally and generally.110 The law of the sea has strong roots in customary interna105 See Steven Freeland & Yun Zhao, Rules of the “Space Road:” How Soft Law
Principles Interact with Customary International Law for the Regulation of Space Activities, 42 J. SPACE L. 405, 409, 419 (2020).
106 G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII) (Dec. 13, 1963).
107 MANFRED LACHS, THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: AN EXPERIENCE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW-MAKING 128 (Tanja Masson-Zwaan & Stephen Hobe eds., 2010).
108 Ram S. Jakhu & Steven Freeland, The Relationship Between the Outer Space
Treaty and Customary International Law, 67TH INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL CONG. 7
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3397145 [https://
perma.cc/7JVS-ZNWN].
109 See Fuller, supra note 104, at 11–13.
110 See Patricia Minola, Comment, The Moon Treaty and the Law of the Sea, 18 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 455, 466 (1981). For example, space is traversed using spaceships
launched from spaceports.
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tional law,111 with traffic and navigational norms emerging as
customary principles.112 Legal terminology from the international law of the sea rules for navigation has been adopted by
the space industry113 and academics114 for space traffic.
It can be argued that one of the very first generally applicable
pieces of space traffic regulation was the right of overflight by
satellite.115 The right to orbit satellites over other countries’ territories gained customary status through the repetitive acts of
overflight by the only two space powers of the time, the United
States and the Soviet Union, with no protest from overflown
countries.116 The right of overflight for space vessels was not a
given.117 Although the customary law principles of the right of
innocent passage118 and freedom of navigation119 had long been
established in the international law of the sea, the more recently
developed body of international air law has no general allowance for overflight.120 The early establishment of the right of
access and use of space121 was crucial in enabling the rapid development of satellite technology during the space race.122 The
freedom of access and use of space remains an important principle of space law and an important context for the issue of growing traffic.123 Like the establishment of the right to overflight
was essential for the development in the early space age,124 the
JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPINTERNATIONAL LAW 13–15 (2011).
112 Id. at 1.
113 See Minola, supra note 110, at 466–70.
114 Ruth E. Stilwell, Diane Howard & Sven Kaltenhauser, Overcoming Sovereignty
for Space Traffic Management, 7 J. SPACE SAFETY ENG’G 158, 159 (2020); ContantJorgenson et al., supra note 12, at 285.
115 MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE: RECOGNIZING GROTIAN MOMENTS 127–28 (2013).
116 Id.
117 See id.
118 See Martin Lishexian Lee, The Interrelation Between the Law of the Sea Convention and Customary International Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 405, 410–11 (2006).
119 The concept of free navigation and passage in the international law of the
sea can be traced back to Hugo Grotius’s concept of Mare Liberum. See Albert J.
Hoffmann, Freedom of Navigation, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L. paras. 2–3, https://
cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/A.J.Hoffmann-Freedom-of-Navigation-EPIL.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KC2-33SE] (Apr. 2011).
120 Thomas Gangale, How High The Sky?, in 13 STUD. SPACE L. 321, 326 (F.G.
von der Dunk et al. eds., 2018).
121 See SCHARF, supra note 115, at 127–28.
122 See id.
123 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. I.
124 See SCHARF, supra note 115, at 127–28.
111
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formation of rules of the road is indispensable for the sustainable development of space activities today. The question is
whether the necessary governance of space traffic will emerge
from custom, as has historically happened in other traffic domains when traffic reached a level where order and alignment
were needed to ensure safe and efficient interactions between
traffic actors.
1.

Customary International Law as Unimpeded by Geopolitical
Tensions

Before the emergence of the United Nations and its host of
treaty-based institutions, most of international law was based in
custom.125 Customary law is arguably the oldest source of international law, yet the very nature of the concept still divides legal
scholars to this day.126 Despite its intangible and debated nature,
international custom is still an important source of international
law and is recognized as such by courts127 and scholars.128 Compared to the meticulous and deliberate work put into ensuring
that every word in an international treaty reflects the will of the
parties, the process of customary international law’s emergence
can seem esoteric.129 Esteemed legal theoretician Hans Kelsen
described the process of law creation through custom as “unconscious and unintentional lawmaking. . . . The rule of law is the
effect and not the purpose.”130 This description captures an important tenant of customary law: that it emerges as a byproduct
of conduct and is not deliberately created.
125 See Omri Sender & Michael Wood, The Emergence of Customary International
Law: Between Theory and Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 133, 134 (Catherine Brölmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2016).
126 See, e.g., Monica Hakimi, Making Sense of Customary International Law, 118
MICH. L. REV. 1487, 1489–1527 (2020); Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L.
173, 173–74 (2010); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a Source of International Law, in
47 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1974–1975, at 1, 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 1977).
127 Courts and states often refer to and rely on customary principles in international disputes. See, e.g., North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./
Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 23–43 (Feb. 20).
128 See Omri Sender & Michael Wood, Custom’s Bright Future: The Continuing
Importance of Customary International Law, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 360, 360 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016).
129 See Brian D. Lepard, Customary International Law as a Dynamic Process, in CUSTOM’S FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD, supra note 128, at 62,
63–67.
130 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 308 (1952).
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As the emergence of customary law does not depend on intent or explicit consent, states may through their actions contribute to the formation of rules that they would not otherwise
have agreed to.131 The process of customary law creation is
therefore not necessarily hindered by geopolitical tensions,
which might block progress on the development of treaty-based
regulation in the space sector.132 In truth, an important role of
international custom can be filling holes in the body of international law when written agreements prove difficult to establish
due to political or diplomatic reasons.133 This feature of customary law might prove significant in a time where urgent need for
space governance coincides with serious strain in the international relations between the major space powers.
2.

The Inherent Uniformity of Customary International Law

Treaties and conventions only bind the signatories, while a
norm, once established as customary international law, “is binding on all states, even those new to a type of activity, so long as
they did not persistently object” during the formation of the
rule.134 This feature of custom is significant in the space domain, as new actors continuously enter the league of spacefaring
nations and the newcomers will be bound by the customary
rules already in place.135 While creating a global traffic regime
via an international convention would in principle require all
current and future spacefaring nations to agree and ratify, a regime based on custom would be universal by default and require
states to actively and persistently object to avoid being bound.136
Though states can in principle avoid being bound by custom
in this manner, states cannot unilaterally withdraw from a cus131 See Paul B. Stephan, Privatizing International Law, 97 VA. L. REV. 1573,
1586–88 (2011).
132 See discussion supra Section II.A.
133 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 91, at 46.
134 SCHARF, supra note 115, at 30.
135 It should be noted that although this feature of customary law is an advantage in terms of providing the global uniformity of space traffic rules, it potentially skews the regime unjustly in favor of the currently dominant space powers
relative to nations venturing into space in the future. For an expansion of this
argument as a critique of international law in general, see Makau Mutua &
Antony Anghie, What Is TWAIL?, 94 PROC. 112TH ANN. MEETING (AM. SOC’Y INT’L
L.) 31, 31 (2000).
136 U.N. Inst. for Disarmament Rsch., Conf. Rep.: Security in Space: The Next
Generation, U.N. Doc UNIDIR/2008/14, at 161 (2008), https://unidir.org/
sites/default/files/publication/pdfs//security-in-space-the-next-generation-conference-report-31-march-1-april-2008-342.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QAZ-JBAX].
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tomary rule once they have been bound.137 Traffic rules based
on custom, therefore, have the advantage of being stable and
able to maintain the universalism required for their
effectiveness.138
3.

Speed of Customary Law Formation and Its Backward-Looking
Nature

There has been a long-running debate in legal scholarship on
the time required for customary norms to form with positions
ranging from instant formation,139 to over-accelerated formation,140 to requiring decades to pass.141 Customary law is historical in nature in that it builds on state acts,142 and on that ground
it can be argued that custom is unsuited to regulate a fast-developing issue such as congestion in space. Some courts have indeed held that international custom requires a specific number
of years to be formed.143 However, the ICJ has held that a short
time period does not preclude customary law formation as long
as the relevant state practice is extensive and uniform.144 The
trajectory of societal and technological development, leading to
faster and more frequent interactions between states and im137 Jonathan I. Charney, The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International Law, in 56 BRITISH Y.B. INT’L L. 1985, at 1, 2 (1986).
138 Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in International Customary
Law, 17 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 279, 282 (2009).
139 This was famously argued to be the case for the basic principles contained
in the 1963 U.N. Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space. See Bin Cheng, United Nations
Resolutions on Outer Space: “Instant” International Customary Law?, 5 INDIAN J. INT’L
L. 23, 27–38 (1965).
140 This may be argued under certain conditions of rapid societal or technological change. See SCHARF, supra note 115, at 30; Michael P. Scharf, Seizing the “Grotian Moment”: Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law in Times of
Fundamental Change, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 439–44 (2010).
141 See Michael P. Scharf, Accelerated Formation of Customary International Law, 20
ILSA J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 305, 306 (2014).
142 Echoing this assessment of custom, ICJ Judge Koretsky describes the historical nature of customary international law by stating that “by and large, customary
international law turns its face to the past.” North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 156 (Feb. 20) (Koretsky, J.,
dissenting).
143 For example, German and French jurisprudence generally requires thirty
to forty years of consistent state practice for a new customary rule to be recognized. The International Law Commission also earlier supported this view of slow
crystallization. See Scharf, supra note 141, at 306.
144 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. at 43 (“[T]he passage of only a
short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new
rule of customary international law . . .”).
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proved transparency of actions, also supports the thesis of accelerated formation of custom.145 In conclusion, while customary
law cannot, by its nature, be formed proactively in anticipation
of a regulatory need as is the case with treaty law, it can, under
certain conditions, emerge rapidly in response to an issue if the
required state practice and opinio juris are present.146
IV.

THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY TRAFFIC RULES
FOR EARTH’S ORBITS

The preceding Sections have established that a traffic regime
based wholly or partly on customary rules would have a number
of advantages in terms of its global uniformity, binding force,
timely development, and ability to emerge even in a frosty geopolitical climate.147 Having established that customary rules can
theoretically form the basis for a future space traffic regime, we
now turn to the specifics of how and where to look for the emergence of customary rules of the road for orbital space.
It is generally accepted that two components of customary international law must be present for a rule to emerge as a binding custom.148 First, it must embody the general practice of
states (usus), and, second, it must be accepted by states as law
(opinio juris).149 From a doctrinal, legal positivist perspective,
both components can be evidenced by observing the factual
conduct and public communications of states.150
State practice (usus) is demonstrated by showing widespread,
uniform, and repetitive acts by states over time.151 State acts, for
the purpose of identifying customs, are broadly construed to include both international acts such as conduct towards other
states, and internal acts, such as administrative processes, legislaSee Scharf, supra note 140, at 446.
See id.
147 See discussion supra Sections III.B.1–.3.
148 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Seventieth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/73/10, at 129 (2018).
149 Customary international law is defined in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.”
ICJ Statute, supra note 90, art. 38(1)(b). For an authoritative review of the meaning of the terms, see Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 122–23.
150 The traditional view of usus and opinio juris as the only relevant elements for
formation of international custom is being challenged by recent studies. For a
survey of nontraditional scholarship that argues for customary international law
emerging from other sources, such as the rulings of international tribunals, see
Baker, supra note 126.
151 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 129, 129 n.688.
145
146
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tion, or court decisions.152 The keystone of the usus element is
the notion of practice; it requires the actual conduct of states, as
opposed to mere pronouncements, statements, and the like.153
It is therefore possible to have states evincing practice in disharmony with the official, communicated stance of the state on an
issue or rule.154
The second requirement for a rule to emerge as custom is
that the states believe they are legally bound by the rule (opinio
juris).155 The determination of the subjective attitude or beliefs
of a state can be based upon a broad range of sources, such as
internal and external diplomatic communications, guidelines to
public servants, pleadings before international tribunals, or positions taken in international organizations such as the United
Nations.156 The distinction between the two tightly intertwined
elements that must be present for a customary rule to exist is
largely a theoretical construct and can be difficult to draw in
practice.157 However, the categories of usus and opinio juris are
well-established in legal scholarship and the precedents of international courts and tribunals.158 In addition, the elements serve
as useful categories for structuring the analysis of international
law.159 In the next Section, it will be demonstrated that the proposition of rules of the road for orbit is characterized by traits
that fit well within the requisite components of customary law
status.
A.

PRACTICE: CONJUNCTIONS WILL PROVIDE LOTS
REPETITIONS

OF

With increasing regularity, operators of satellites in LEO will
need to make decisions about the prioritization of traffic, with
no clear right-of-way norms like the ones present in other traffic
domains such as the sea, roads, and airspace.160 For example, on
See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 91, at 37–38.
See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 135.
154 See id.
155 See id. at 139.
156 See HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 91, at 37–38.
157 Cf. Omri Sender & Michael Wood, A Mystery No Longer? Opinio Juris and
Other Theoretical Controversies Associated with Customary International Law, 50 ISR. L.
REV. 299, 302 (2017).
158 For a review of the current status of usus and opinio juris in international
law, see Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 129.
159 See Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, State Opinio Juris and International
Humanitarian Law Pluralism, 91 INT’L L. STUD. 171, 176 (2015).
160 See Frandsen, supra note 16, at 232–33.
152
153
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the sea, rules of the road allow ships to make right-of-way decisions based on propulsion systems—motor-driven ships must
give way to sailboats.161 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
analyze the many potential parameters that could be used to decide right-of-way and similar essential traffic principles for satellites,162 but yet, no clear norms have emerged.
In the gradually more congested orbits, there is an increasing
number of conjunctions between satellites in which operators
must choose an appropriate maneuver to mitigate the risk of
collision.163 As there are no international norms or rules for
right-of-way or similar norms of traffic prioritization, each encounter is handled on an ad hoc basis based on the discretion
and risk appetite of the individual operators.164
It is the nature of orbital mechanics that some altitudes and
inclinations are easier to reach or especially suited for specific
purposes; therefore, the population of satellites is not evenly distributed in Earth’s orbits.165 Specific regions of LEO can be
characterized as orbital highways in which a large proportion of
satellites are operated.166 Operators with several satellites or constellations operating in the same orbital region will often experience multiple conjunctions with each other.167 A practice can
therefore quickly have a documented history of repeated similar
interactions that could, if they follow discernible principles, provide evidence for the emergence of a norm.
As the absolute number of conjunctions, as well as the number of conjunctions per satellite in LEO, continue to grow at a
161 For the rules governing prioritization of vessels at sea based on propulsion,
see U.N. Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions
at Sea, Rule 18, Oct. 20, 1972, 1050 U.N.T.S. 17. Note that the international rules
of the road at sea use different parameters for guiding traffic, including positional ones.
162 For a list of potential parameters that future right-of-way rules in orbit
could build on, see Martin Michel & Reinhold Bertrand, Assessment of Inter-Operator Rule-Based Collision Avoidance Operations, 8 PROC. EUR. CONF. ON SPACE DEBRIS
§§ 3.3–4.2 (2021).
163 Yan Zhang, Bin Li, Hongkang Liu & Jizhang Sang, An Analysis of Close Approaches and Probability of Collisions Between LEO Resident Space Objects and Mega Constellations, 25 GEO-SPATIAL INFO. SCI. 104, 104–06 (2022).
164 See Borowitz et al., supra note 72, at 2.
165 Elisa Maria Alessi, Giulia Schettino, Alessandro Rossi & Giovanni B. Valsecchi, Natural Highways for End-of-Life Solutions in the LEO Region, 130 CELESTIAL
MECHS. & DYNAMICAL ASTRONOMY 33, 34–35 (2018).
166 See Lawrence et al., supra note 9, at 428.
167 See id. at 433.
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significant pace,168 so will the observable practice of operators’
decisions on who has the right-of-way in different situations. If
patterns emerge in how operators choose to handle conjunctions, so might customs, as they did on the seas centuries past.169
B.

DOCUMENTED STATE PRACTICE THROUGH BETTER SPACE
DATA

For state practice to potentially serve as evidence of the crystallization of a norm, the acts must be observable and documented.170 All over the globe, private, public, and military
installations are being built and expanded to provide better
“space domain awareness.”171 The improvement of space domain awareness172 technology and the resulting better data on
maneuvers in space make documenting practices easier. Private
service providers173 and non-governmental initiatives174 increasingly make data about traffic in space broadly available. The
United States possesses the largest and most capable space domain awareness network and is committed to making the data
available to operators globally through an open data sharing
platform under development.175 A large number of bilateral
Id.
See Blount, supra note 14, at 8.
170 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 133.
171 See John A. Kennewell & Ba-Ngu Vo, An Overview of Space Situational Awareness, 16th Int’l Conf. on Info. Fusion 1029, 1034–35 (2013), http://ba-ngu.voau.com/vo/KV_SSA_FUSION13.pdf [https://perma.cc/J24F-MB73]; Mariel
Borowitz, Strategic Implications of the Proliferation of Space Situational Awareness Technology and Information: Lessons Learned from the Remote Sensing Sector, 47 SPACE POL’Y
18, 18–20 (2019).
172 “Space domain awareness” is also often referred to as “space situational
awareness” or “space surveillance and tracking.” The terms all refer to the technical capability to monitor assets and activities of the orbital domain around earth.
These capabilities are essential to space traffic management and are increasingly
seen as critical to national security. See Kennewell & Vo, supra note 171, at 1029;
Borowitz, supra note 171, at 18.
173 The number of private companies providing space situational awareness
services is growing. See, e.g., Tracking and Monitoring: Protect Your Fleet, Your Business, and Your Bottom Line, LEOLABS, https://leolabs.space/ [https://perma.cc/
7ALD-NUS]; NORTHSTAR, https://northstar-data.com/ [https://perma.cc/GJ8JQJM7]; Free Collision Risk Assessment: No Strings Attached, PRIVATEER, https://mission.privateer.com [https://perma.cc/W8CH-Y729].
174 See ASTRIAGRAPH, http://astria.tacc.utexas.edu/AstriaGraph/ [https://
perma.cc/E9FS-3TL2].
175 See Diane Howard, U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Sci. &
Tech. Subcomm., Open Architecture Data Repository 3–4 (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/copuos/stsc/2021/tech-55E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9QVG-RKDD].
168
169
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space domain awareness data sharing agreements already have
been concluded between the United States and other countries.176 The traffic conduct of operators therefore becomes
gradually more transparent and available as evidence of practice
for the purpose of identifying emerging norms.
In addition to enabling the documentation of norms, transparency of traffic conduct can, in itself, facilitate norm emergence, as it allows operators to observe, learn from, and
potentially emulate each other’s approaches.177 As new space actors join the traffic in orbit, they may look to the increasing volume of available data about how more experienced actors
handle conjunctions and other traffic incidents. The build-out
of space domain awareness capabilities by states and commercial
actors and the growing public availability of data about space
traffic can therefore have the unintended effect of contributing
to the emergence of customary traffic norms.
C.

THE DOCTRINE

OF

SPECIALLY AFFECTED STATES

According to the doctrine of “specially affected states” developed by the ICJ in North Sea Continental Shelf, the acts of certain
states might carry increased weight in the formation of custom,
if they are specially affected.178 The concept of specially affected
states has been criticized for being theoretically underdeveloped
and for being misapplied in favor of powerful states in the
Global North.179 This critique is especially relevant in relation to
space because many states in the Global South are not yet
spacefaring.180 When considering which states are specially affected, the interests of emerging and future spacefaring nations,
in a sustainable space traffic regime, should not be overlooked.
The United States is the nation with the greatest number of
active satellites in space,181 the largest public and private space
176 See Debra Werner, International SSA Agreements Could Pave the Way for Further
Space Cooperation, Panelists Said, SPACENEWS (Apr. 18, 2018), https://
spacenews.com/international-ssa-agreements-could-pave-the-way-for-furtherspace-cooperation-panelists-said/ [https://perma.cc/DA5P-VXZQ].
177 See Blount, supra note 14, at 8.
178 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Den.; Ger./Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. 3, 4 (Feb. 20).
179 See Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected States and the Formation of Custom, 112
AM. J. INT’L L. 191, 199–200 (2018), for a systematic and critical analysis of the
concept.
180 See id. at 205–06.
181 Estimating the exact number of satellites in orbit varies according to different sources. Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), an NGO, maintains an online
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sector, and the most-developed space domain awareness capabilities. The clearly dominant position of the United States in
space increases the norm-setting power of U.S. traffic practice,
in the same way that Great Britain’s then-dominant position defined the rules of the road on the seas during the formation
period.182
It is difficult to envision emergence of specific traffic norms in
space as binding if they are in opposition to U.S. practice, although the objections of one state would not in general prevent
the formation of a customary rule.183 In addition, the advent of
commercial mega-constellations means that a small number of
commercial operators, such as SpaceX and OneWeb, control
the majority of active satellites.184 Until more nations and companies realize their own plans for mega-constellations, the dominant commercial operators and their state regulators might
greatly influence traffic norms by establishing practices.
D.

SOURCES

OF

OPINIO JURIS

FOR

SPACE TRAFFIC NORMS

The second component that must be demonstrated for a customary rule to emerge is the opinio juris—the evidence that
states consider themselves bound by the norm.185 It is this sense
of legal duty that distinguishes the customary rules from mere
habits or traditions of states.186 Determining the subjective reasoning of a state in relation to space traffic is not straightforward, and many different sources can be considered relevant,
from communications between operators to space agency
guidelines.187
Although it can be challenging to discern if state proclamations in the U.N. General Assembly are meant as an expression
database tracking active satellites. As of May 1, 2022, UCS determined there are
5,465 active satellites in orbit, of which 3,433 are American. See UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 55.
182 HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 91, at 39.
183 See Shelly Aviv Yeini, The Specially-Affecting States Doctrine, 112 AM. J. INT’L L.
244, 244–45 (2018).
184 See Therese Wood, Who Owns Our Orbit: Just How Many Satellites Are There in
Space?, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/
2020/10/visualizing-easrth-satellites-sapce-spacex/ [https://perma.cc/8XQYEUP2] (finding the top 5 commercial operators now control more than 50% of
all active satellites).
185 SCHARF, supra note 115, at 47.
186 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 140.
187 See id. at 120.
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of lex lata or lex feranda,188 the forum remains a primary forum
for states to share their considered opinions on international
norms. The General Assembly and the specialized forums for
outer space, such as the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses
of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), are therefore, a primary source
for identifying opinio juris of states.189 In recognition of the issue
of increasing traffic and congestion in space, space traffic management since 2016 has been a fixed point on the agenda at the
annual meetings of the UNCOPUOS Legal Subcommittee.190
Statements by states hereunder, as well as in the general discussions during the sessions, can shed light on developing opinio
juris. The statements and discussions of space traffic in U.N. forums191 reflect the international consensus that better governance of space traffic is needed to ensure sustainable access to
space, but any substantial discussions of actual rules of the road
for orbit have yet to materialize.
When national space agencies make public agreements or
proclamations about how they will handle space traffic, it can be
taken as evidence for how the state views norms for space traffic.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA),
the European Space Agency (ESA), and other major space agencies have published handbooks and guidelines on handling con188 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing Space Threats Through Norms,
Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, ¶¶ 41–44, U.N. Doc. A/76/77 (July
13, 2021). In this context, lex lata expresses an opinion about what the law currently is, while lex ferenda refers to an opinion about what the law ought to be, i.e.,
an expression of desire to change the current law. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 168–169 (2009).
189 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 120.
190 Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm.
on Its Fifty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1113, at 2, 30 (Apr. 27, 2016);
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its
Sixtieth Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1122, at 1 (Apr. 18, 2017); Comm. on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1177, at 3 (Apr. 30, 2018); Comm. on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second Session,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1203, at 2 (Apr. 18, 2019); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Fourth Session U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/1243, at 2 (June 24, 2021); Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space, Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/1260, at 1 (Apr. 19, 2022).
191 See Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Annotated Provisional
Agenda of the Sci. & Tech. Subcomm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.1/L.392, at paras.
8, 13 (Dec. 9, 2021); U.N. Secretary-General, Reducing Space Threats Through
Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behaviours, U.N. Doc. A/76/77, § 5 (July
13, 2021).
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junctions.192 Although the public space agencies are not
regulators tasked with creating law, their published materials
can be used to ascertain opinio juris.193 Some of the technical
guidelines published by space agencies have wording that could
be construed to imply legal obligations. Formulations found in a
Handbook published by NASA, such as “[t]he ascending/descending spacecraft that is equipped to maneuver needs to yield
the right-of-way to existing on-orbit assets by performing risk
mitigation maneuvers or ascent/descent trajectory alterations,”194 have the form and meaning of a rule of the road provision. Trends across such technical materials published by state
agencies provide evidence of opinio juris.195
Another source to consider when ascertaining opinio juris is
technical standards published by, referred to, or endorsed by
states.196 A large body of international technical standards relates to space sustainability and debris management, which are
at least partially relevant to space traffic. Several of these technical standards, for example, the ISO Standard 24113, on space
debris mitigation,197 have significant state support evident
through national legislation and endorsement by public space
agencies.198 When states make explicit reference and demand
adherence to specific technical standards, inter alia as part of
licensing requirements, it is reasonable to consider the standards as relevant to opinio juris.199 Some authors argue that technical standards have come to play a central role in international
law for regulating technology when states are unable to agree
See J.D. Harrington, NASA Releases Best Practices Handbook to Help Improve
Space Safety, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-releases-best-practices-handbook-to-help-improve-space-safety [https://perma.cc/9FEA-FA9J] (Jan.
4, 2021); Jessica, ESA Publishes Guidelines for Safe Close-Proximity Operations, CLEAN
SPACE BLOG (Nov. 15, 2021), https://blogs.esa.int/cleanspace/2021/11/15/esapublishes-guidelines-for-safe-close-proximity-operations/ [https://perma.cc/
X4QG-TK7U].
193 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 120.
194 NASA, NASA SPACECRAFT CONJUNCTION ASSESSMENT AND COLLISION AVOIDANCE BEST PRACTICES HANDBOOK 13 (2020).
195 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 120.
196 ANDREA BARRIOS VILLARREAL, INTERNATIONAL STANDARDIZATION AND THE
AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL BARRIERS TO TRADE 58 (2018).
197 H. Stokes et al., Evolution of ISO’s Space Debris Mitigation Standards, 7 J. SPACE
SAFETY ENG’G 325, 326 (2020).
198 F. Alby, 30 Years of Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines in Europe, in SPACE
SAFETY IS NO ACCIDENT 3, 10 (Tommaso Sgobba & Isabelle Rongier eds., 2015).
199 Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 125.
192
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through traditional means.200 It is an explicit policy goal of several leading space powers to develop technical standards and
guidelines for space traffic,201 and some are under development
in international standardization bodies.202 The engagement of
states in the development of international technical standards
through international standardization bodies and the implementation of standards in national governance of space traffic
may be central to identifying opinio juris for rules of the road.
The preceding Sections surveyed the sources of state practice
and state opinio juris in relation to identifying emerging customary traffic rules for Earth’s orbit. To gain legal effect, a custom
requires evidence of pervasiveness and uniformity in both practice and opinio juris, although the amount and form of evidence
needed are debated.203 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
conduct an in-depth investigation of these sources to precisely
determine their current status. Even though there is definite potential for customary traffic rules, as supported by the arguments above, the cautious assessment of this author is that no
customary norms are yet discernible in state practice in the
traditional, doctrinal sense.
Before we can close the investigation, we must turn our attention to the rapidly rising private space industry and gauge its
influence on the object of this study: the emergence of customary traffic rules.
V.

CUSTOMARY LAW EMANATING FROM PRIVATE
ACTORS

The rise to prominence of private actors in the space sector is
undeniable. The massive increase in active satellites is primarily
driven by commercial actors whose launch activities now dwarf
both military and other government uses in terms of assets
launched.204 For most of human history, placing assets in orbit
VILLARREAL, supra note 196, at 3.
See, e.g., Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 28969, 28969–74 (June 21, 2018); EC Joint Communication, supra
note 10, at 10–11.
202 For example, ISO is working on a standard for Space Traffic Coordination.
See ISO, supra note 51.
203 JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
23 (2006).
204 UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 55. It should be noted that public
actors are still responsible for the largest share of investment in the space industry, and public sector customers continue to be an important source of revenue
for the private space industry. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De200
201
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was a capability limited to a few militaries and state-sponsored
space agencies.205 However, in recent years, this has been changing rapidly, and commercial space companies now account for
more than eighty percent of all new payloads placed in LEO.206
In addition to the sheer quantitative increase in activities, the
diversity and scope of commercial space missions are expanding, with, inter alia, mega-constellations, space tourism, onorbit servicing, and refueling.207 All around the globe, commercial actors are working on mega-constellations with various purposes, from world-spanning internet to Earth observation.208 If
just a fraction of the planned constellations is realized in the
coming years, we will witness a further acceleration in the quantitative and qualitative dominance of commercial satellites in
Earth’s orbit. The private space industry has a significant interest in how the regulation of space develops and is actively seeking to influence it through extensive lobbying efforts,209 and by
seeking to influence technical standards committees.210
However, it is not clear if and how the mounting financial and
technical power of the private sector translates to influence over
international regulation of space traffic. The influence of commercial firms on international regulation is an active and welldeveloped field of study, with extensive writings on, inter alia,
the role of lobbying in international law,211 commercial firms’
velopment [OECD], Space Economy for People, Planet and Prosperity, at 6, (Sept.
2021), https://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/space-forum/space-economy-for-peopleplanet-and-prosperity.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ88-KE9L].
205 See Wood, supra note 184.
206 For an updated overview of data about developments in the number of active satellites, launch traffic, and other metrics, see ESA, ESA’S ANNUAL SPACE
ENVIRONMENT REPORT 4 (2022), https://www.sdo.esoc.esa.int/environment_report/Space_Environment_Report_latest.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4Q2L968].
207 Gil Denis et al., From New Space to Big Space: How Commercial Space Dream Is
Becoming a Reality, 166 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 431, 435 (2020).
208 Aaron C. Boley & Michael Byers, Satellite Mega-Constellations Create Risks in
Low Earth Orbit, the Atmosphere and on Earth, 11 SCI. REPS. 1, 1 (2021).
209 Anna Massoglia & Julia Forrest, Lobbying Spending Skyrockets as Billionaire
Space Race Takes Off, OPEN SECRETS, (July 30, 2021, 11:21 AM), https://
www.opensecrets.org/news/2021/07/lobbying-spending-skyrockets-as-billionairespace-race-takes-off/ [https://perma.cc/32ZE-99UB].
210 See, e.g., Streamlining Licensing Procedures for Small Satellites, 85 Fed.
Reg. 43711 (July 20, 2020) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 25).
211 SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 78 (Steve Smith et al. eds., 2003); Melissa J. Durkee,
International Lobbying Law, 127 YALE L.J. 1742, 1742 (2018).
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regulatory power through technical standards,212 and trends toward privatization of international law.213 In comparison to the
growing body of legal scholarship and other social science studies into the regulatory power of nonstate actors and institutions,214 the role of private firms in the emergence of uncodified
customary international law is relatively unexplored.
Conventionally, private organizations have not been seen as
relevant to the formation of customary international law, as new
norms could only emanate from states, i.e., the subjects and creators of international law.215 However, this view is being challenged by a few legal scholars expanding on private actors’
potential influence on customary law.216 The attempts at theorizing around private actors’ influence on custom can generally
be divided into (1) doctrinally based approaches focusing on
how private acts can be ascribed to state actors as evidence of
customary norms, and (2) socio–legal approaches departing
fully from the traditional state-centric view by investigating private companies as “norm entrepreneurs.”217 The approaches are
not mutually exclusive but represent two fundamentally different conceptualizations of what legal norms are, how they
emerge, and how they influence state behavior. Both perspectives shine light on significant aspects of how customary rules of
the road for space traffic might evolve the role of nonstate entities in their emergence.
TIM BÜTHE & WALTER MATTLI, THE NEW GLOBAL RULERS?: THE PRIVATIZAREGULATION IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1–9 (2011).
213 See Stephan, supra note 131, at 1618.
214 The field of study into regulation beyond the traditional command-andcontrol legislative powers of the state is developed under different terms such as
“new governance.” See Jason M. Solomon, New Governance, Preemptive Self-Regulation, and the Blurring of Boundaries in Regulatory Theory and Practice, 591 WIS. L. REV.
591, 596–97 (2010); Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 1, 14–15 (2002).
215 Christopher Greenwood, Sources of International Law: An Introduction, § 2
(2008), https://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf [https://
perma.cc/GFJ5-FUE3].
216 See Melissa J. Durkee, Interstitial Space Law, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 426
(2019); Karol Wolfke, Some Persistent Controversies Regarding Customary International
Law, in 24 NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 4 (1993); Paul Przemyslaw Polanski, Cyberspace: A
New Branch of International Customary Law?, 33 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 371, 375
(2017); Isabelle R. Gunning, Modernizing Customary International Law: The Challenge of Human Rights, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 211, 221–22 (1991).
217 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L. ORG. 887, 896–97 (1998); Durkee, supra note 216, at
427–28.
212
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“[W]hen nations do not exploit the choice to proactively develop international law, private actors can shape it instead. The
attributed lawmaking theory shows that private actors can contribute to formal lawmaking by standing in the shoes of the
state—they are lawmakers by attribution.”218
In the presentation of the theory of attributed lawmaking,
Durkee argues that the actions of private actors, when authorized and supervised by a state, can be attributed to a state and
contribute to the creation of customary law.219 Although the
conduct and opinions of nonstate actors are traditionally not
seen as directly relevant to the formation of customary international law, Durkee’s approach does not overturn the traditional
theory of custom.220 Rather, it is a natural extension or modernization of the doctrinal view of customary law to reflect the real
norm-setting power of private actors in modern international relations.221 The theory does not confer lawmaking power directly
onto the private actors but rather adds their actions to the list of
sources from which to glimpse state practice to establish customary norms.222 The argument for attributed lawmaking is firmly
based on formalist and positivist legal reasoning and does not
challenge the core logic of customary law theory.223
In her original presentation of the theory of attributed lawmaking, Durkee supports her argument with a case study of private firms’ influence on the international regime governing
natural resource appropriation in outer space.224 The issue of
ownership and acquisition of space resources is principally important, but due to technical realities, it is very far from being a
practical problem anytime soon.225 The issue of congestion in
orbit, on the other hand, has materialized already and has
moved from the realm of speculative legal conundrums to realDurkee, supra note 216, at 429.
Id. at 443–45.
220 See id. at 440–42.
221 Id. at 443.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 473–74.
224 Id. at 449–71.
225 See Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, How the Asteroid-Mining Bubble Burst, MIT
TECH. REV. (June 26, 2019), https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/06/26/
134510/asteroid-mining-bubble-burst-history/ [https://perma.cc/Q9XS-W3BN].
218
219
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world issues with real parties needing answers.226 In terms of theory validation and development for the still-novel concept of attributed lawmaking, the case of orbital traffic rules has the
benefit of a much larger pool of data, as all spacefaring nations
have an acute and current interest in the underlying issue.
B.

STATE RESPONSIBILITY

FOR

PRIVATE ACTORS

Durkee argues that states are responsible for the acts of their
legal and natural persons under the basic rules of international
law and that the theory of attributed lawmaking is generally applicable.227 Additionally, due to lex specialis considerations arising from core principles of international space law, the theory of
attribution is particularly strong for space law, as will be explicated below.
A core principle of the Outer Space Treaty provides:
States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for national activities in outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for assuring that national activities are carried out in conformity with
the provisions set forth in the present Treaty.228

This provision explicitly makes states responsible for the actions of non-governmental entities, such as commercial firms.
The state responsibility established here includes accountability
for private actors’ conduct in orbit.
Article VI goes on to specify that “[t]he activities of non-governmental entities in outer space, including the moon and
other celestial bodies, shall require authorization and continuing
supervision by the appropriate State Party to the Treaty.”229
Therefore, states are not only responsible for private actors in
space, but they are also under an obligation to authorize and
226 Recently, there have been several reports of near collisions between assets
in LEO, including manned space stations. See ESA Spacecraft Dodges Large Constellation, ESA (Mar. 9, 2019), https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/ESA_spacecraft_
dodges_large_constellation [https://perma.cc/9EAW-5PJC]; Bojan Pancevski,
Elon Musk’s Satellite Internet Project Is Too Risky, Rivals Say, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 19,
2021, 6:16 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/elon-musks-satellite-internet-pro
ject-is-too-risky-rivals-say-11618827368 [https://perma.cc/89UA-GVBN]; Chen
Lan, The Starlink-China Space Station Near-Collision: Questions, Solutions, and an Opportunity, SPACE REV. (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.thespacereview.com/article/
4338/1 [https://perma.cc/3QNT-FSFZ].
227 Durkee, supra note 216, at 427–29.
228 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. VI (emphasis added).
229 Id. (emphasis added).
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continuously supervise their activities. This obligation makes it
difficult for states to claim that they are not aware of the actions
of their non-governmental actors in space. By extension, the
traffic norms followed by the private actors are supervised and
authorized by their state and can be attributed as state practice.
Any emerging traffic norms, such as the resolution of conjunction maneuvers, would be visible to and legally authorized by
states even if the satellites are technically and practically controlled by private entities.230
C.

STATE LIABILITY

FOR

PRIVATE ACTORS

The liability regime in space also aligns with the assertion of
state accountability for the conduct of private actors. The Outer
Space Treaty makes states responsible for damage caused by any
object launched from their territory, irrespective of whether it is
operated by the state or a private company:
[E]ach State Party from whose territory or facility an object is
launched, is internationally liable for damage to another State
Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its component parts on the Earth, in air space or in
outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies.231

The liability established here is further elaborated on by the
Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (Liability Convention),232 which clarifies that
states are liable for any damage in space resulting from the fault
of legal persons they are responsible for.233 This entails state liability for damages resulting from private actors’ failure to adhere to any established traffic norms.
Additionally, a state must, under international law, retain control of objects registered to them: “A State Party to the Treaty on
whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried
shall retain jurisdiction and control over such object, and over any
personnel thereof, while in outer space . . . .”234 The obligation
to control extends to non-governmental objects, such as commercial satellites and space stations in LEO. As part of the InterSee Durkee, supra note 216, at 447–48.
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. VII.
232 Convention on the International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects art. III, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187.
233 Id.
234 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. VIII (emphasis added).
230
231
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national Law Commission’s235 long-running work to clarify state
responsibility, the Commission developed and adopted draft articles on the responsibility of states for internationally wrongful
acts.236 It follows from Article 8 that actions of private actors can
be attributed to states if the conduct is under the control of the
state.237 Although the articles deal specifically with wrongful
acts, the principle of attribution for acts of private persons
under state control is generally applicable.238 Again, this aligns
well with the assertion that the acts of the controlled, private
parties are attributable as state behavior to identify emerging
customary traffic norms.
Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty imposes a duty on states
to conduct all of their space activities with “due regard” to other
state parties’ corresponding interests, and it specifically requires
states to undertake international consultations before they or
their nationals proceed with any actions that may cause potential harmful interference in the peaceful exploration and uses of
outer space.239 It follows that states are under an obligation to
seek international consultation if one of their private actors is
planning a traffic maneuver that may pose a risk to other space
actors.
In sum, international law confers responsibility for, liability
for, and the obligation to authorize, supervise, and control national private space actors and their conduct in orbit. These responsibilities, rights, and obligations regarding private space
actors support the claim that their traffic conduct can be attributed to nations as state practice to identify emerging customs.
Visible and consistent trends in traffic conduct of participants
in orbit, that is, how traffic interactions are handled regularly,
can become traffic norms. If the patterns become clear and repeated enough, these traffic norms can be conceptualized as orbital rules of the road. If private actors, in the interest of their
safety or from a sense of legal obligation, start consistently complying with rules of the road, and this conduct is legally state
235 The International Law Commission is a U.N. organization that the General
Assembly has tasked with “promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification.” G.A. Res. 174 (II), art. 1.1 (Nov. 17, 1947).
236 G.A. Res. 56/83, arts. 1–2 (Jan. 28, 2002).
237 See id. art. 8.
238 See Rüdiger Wolfrum, State Responsibility for Private Actors: An Old Problem of
Renewed Relevance, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF
OSCAR SCHACHTER 423, 424 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005).
239 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 73, art. IX.
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practice, these traffic rules, may, in time, become elevated to
international custom. It may seem far-fetched now, but considering the historical precedent of navigational rules for the analogous law of the sea, the possibility of customary rules of the road
for orbit should not be discarded prematurely.
D.

CONTOURS

OF

OPINIO JURIS FOR STATE RESPONSIBILITY
PRIVATE SPACE TRAFFIC

FOR

As the populations of satellites burgeon, satellites will have to
maneuver more frequently to avoid collisions. The surge in conjunctions between satellites makes the space domain more hazardous and already causes tensions, both among national private
operators240 and internationally.241 The reactions by states concerning hazardous traffic incidents in orbit where their nationals are affected potentially reveal opinio juris. The publicly
available correspondences between states about specific orbital
traffic encounters are still sparse; however, states seem to accept
the international responsibility for the traffic conduct of their
commercial actors, as illustrated in the case below.
One of the rare cases with public, interstate communication
about a specific conjunction is the U.S.–China exchange about a
possible conjunction between a satellite operated and owned by
a private U.S. company and the public Chinese space station
Tiangong.242 The custom of treating private actors as representing their state is illustrated by the exchange in the United Nations where China in a note verbale claimed, “Starlink satellites
launched by Space Exploration Technologies Corporation
(SpaceX) of the United States of America have had two close
encounters with the China Space Station. For safety reasons, the
China Space Station implemented preventive collision avoid-

For example, a number of SpaceX competitors have complained and filed
petitions with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) contending that
SpaceX’s growing fleet of satellites creates collision danger. See Pancevski, supra
note 226.
241 The ESA has been forced to move satellites to avoid collision danger with
SpaceX’s mega-constellation satellites. See ESA, supra note 226.
242 See Rhoda Kwan & Jon Henley, China Berates US After ‘Close Encounters’ with
Elon Musk Satellites, GUARDIAN (Dec. 28, 2021, 7:35 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/science/2021/dec/28/china-complains-to-un-after-spacestation-is-forced-to-move-to-avoid-starlink-satellites [https://perma.cc/NS3B4FRW].
240
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ance control . . . .”243 The note verbale treats the conjunction
and the perceived collision risk as a matter between states governed by international law.
The United States accepts the responsibility for the conduct
of private actors in space as a signatory to the relevant treaties,
and its response states that the United States “is committed to
sustainable, rules-based activities in outer space, whether those
activities are performed by Governments or by non-governmental entities, including the private sector.”244 In the communication, the privately owned and operated Starlink satellites are
consistently referred to as representing the United States: “In
the specific instances cited in the note verbale from China to
the Secretary-General, the United States Space Command did
not estimate a significant probability of collision between the
China Space Station and the referenced United States spacecraft.”245 Both states in the exchange treat the practice of private
space actors as governed by international law, and this strengthens the theory of attributed lawmaking in the case of space traffic. The cases also clearly demonstrate the need for agreed rules
of the road to govern this type of traffic incident. There are currently no formal internationally binding rules of the road that
could have obligated the private actor (SpaceX) to maneuver to
avoid the conjunction, but as the number of satellites grow, all
nations with crewed space stations will have an interest in traffic
norms to avoid dangerous conjunctions with operators. Space is
a naturally hazardous environment for humans, and there is no
need to add traffic collisions to the list of lethal risks. For a maneuver to be relevant in identifying opinio juris, there must be
evidence that operators conducted the maneuver due to a sense
of legal obligation.246 Therefore, it is pertinent to monitor the
language used by states when they discuss these types of traffic
events in the United Nations and other international forums in
the future.
The SpaceX satellite implicated in the case was part of the
private firm’s Starlink mega-constellation consisting of several
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Note Verbale Dated Dec. 3,
2021, from the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations (Vienna) Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1262, at 1 (Dec. 6, 2021).
244 General Assembly, Note Verbale Dated Jan. 28, 2022, from the Permanent
Mission of the United States of America to the United Nations (Vienna) Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1265, at 1 (Jan. 28, 2022).
245 Id. at 2.
246 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 138.
243
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thousand satellites.247 SpaceX owns and operates almost half of
all active satellites, and its Starlink satellites are parties to a large
share of conjunctions in LEO.248 The approach of SpaceX in
handling traffic incidents, therefore, has a great influence on
the formation of norms. The company has signed a joint public
agreement with NASA regulating how the two entities handle
conjunctions between their satellites.249 The agreement effectively obligates SpaceX to “[p]erform evasive action by on-orbit
Starlink satellites to mitigate close approaches and avoid collisions with all NASA assets.”250 Translating the agreement to
“rules of the road” terminology, SpaceX accepts that their satellites must always give way and that NASA assets have the right-ofway in orbit. As a contractual agreement between two parties,
the direct legal rights and obligations do not extend beyond the
parties. However, the very clear assignment of an obligation for
the commercial satellites to give way for the satellites and space
stations of the public actor could potentially be the beginning of
a crystallization of a rule of the road. A trend of private actors
giving public assets priority in space traffic is an example of a
right-of-way rule with the potential to gain customary status
through attributed lawmaking. The implication would be that a
state would be responsible for a collision resulting from one of
their private actors not giving adequate priority to a public asset
of another state.

247 See Joseph Guzman, SpaceX Mega Constellation Raises Concerns of Increased Satellite Collisions, HILL (Feb. 14, 2022), https://thehill.com/changing-america/resilience/smart-cities/594187-spacex-mega-constellation-raises-concerns-of/ [https:/
/perma.cc/QZ3N-U7SB].
248 See Starlink Statistics, JONATHAN’S SPACE PAGES, https://planet4589.org/
space/stats/star/stats.html [https://perma.cc/2UGB-BSXL] (Sept. 20, 2022,
1:02 AM) (SpaceX owns and operates 2,664 satellites); UNION CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 55 (there are 5,465 total operating satellites).
249 The agreement is publicly available and officially called the “Nonreimbursable Space Act Agreement Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Space Exploration Technologies Corp for Flight Safety
Coordination with NASA Assets.” See NASA, Nonreimbursable Space Act Agreement
Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Space Exploration Technologies Corp for Flight Safety Coordination with NASA Assets art. 2 (2021), https://
www.nasa.gov/sites/default/files/atoms/files/nasaspacex_starlink_agreement_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F88S-595M].
250 Id. art. 3.
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COORDINATION

The argument here is not that the private parties can legislate
and create global law but rather that the actions of private actors
can, under certain circumstances, be seen as evidence of an
emerging or existing customary norm. States retain the power to
prevent the norms from forming or gaining customary status by,
inter alia, internationally protesting a practice or requiring different practices through legislation or guidelines.251 However, if
states are passive in the face of space traffic practices forming
clear patterns of repetition, their passivity might be taken as acceptance of the emerging norm.252
Rules of the road in orbit would be valuable for all actors in
space simply by creating predictability about the conduct of
other actors in different traffic situations. Traffic in space
presents a very pure form of the legal archetype of “coordination problems,” in which the value of having a common solution
is often more important than how the problem is solved.253 The
classic example of a coordination problem is what side of the
road one must drive.254 Here, the value of the rule of the road in
question is to provide all actors with a salient perception of what
other actors will do. Although some may prefer driving on either the left or right, all actors will value any solution that provides consistency and predictability.255 Rules of the road for
satellites in space are, of course, much more complicated than
the given example, but they retain the nature of a coordination
problem. Major space powers who have been unwilling to accept
right-of-way rules either dictated or proposed by another state
might accept, through passivity and conduct, a customary norm
as they realize the benefit of common rules. By having the rules
emerge through the practice of public and private space actors,
no nation will have to bow to any other authority or directly negotiate with adversaries. This is indeed a strength of customary
law over treaty law—mutual consent can be reached with no
need to recognize the other party.256
See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 138.
State passivity or acquiescence is generally accepted as evidence for both
usus and opinio juris. See Akehurst, supra note 126, at 38–39.
253 Leslie Green, Law, Co-ordination and the Common Good, 3 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 299, 302–03 (1983).
254 See id.
255 See id.
256 See Blount, supra note 14, at 7.
251
252
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In sum, there is a theoretical possibility of future space traffic
rules emerging as customary rules binding on all states based
partially on private space activities. The sources of evidence to
draw from are not limited to the acts and communications of
states, as the conduct of non-governmental space actors can also
be attributed to the states.257 For the case of orbital traffic rules,
the proposition of attributed lawmaking seems both convincing
and relevant. The theory shines light on a potential path for
rules of the road to emerge, encompassing the growing influence of private actors while retaining states as the primary subjects and creators of international law. Still, it must be recalled
that the arguments here are limited to identifying potential avenues for rules of the road to emerge in the future, based on
what is known today.
VI.

NORMS AS PRECURSOR AND SCAFFOLDING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW

As argued above, a future scenario with customary rules of the
road for space is not unthinkable, given the pressure for governance and the unlikelihood of a timely treaty solution. This Part
of the Article moves beyond doctrinal legal thinking and seeks
to trace the path from norm inception to customary law. It argues that norm emergence is an essential step on the path to
formation of customary international law and that private actors
can play a crucial role in instigating the informal norms that
become precursors for international customary rules. The objective here is not to investigate how norms influence the behavior
of private space actors generally, but rather to uncover how
states, as regulators and subjects of international law, are influenced by norms created or advanced by private actors. By going
beyond the black letter approach, private actors can be seen as
international norm creators in their own right, forming international practices that over time and through various paths might
end up as legal reality. First, to lay a proper foundation for the
analysis, we turn to the distinction between norms and laws.
A.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORMS
SCIENCE

AND

LAW

IN

LEGAL

The emergence of international norms has been the subject
of expansive academic literature in various nonlegal social sci257

See Durkee, supra note 216, at 427–29.
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ence disciplines from political science to sociology.258 The exact
definition of “norms” varies between disciplines and
frameworks, but it can be roughly defined as relatively stable expectations about how certain actors should conduct themselves
in certain situations.259
The emergence of global norms does not happen in isolation
from norm development in domestic spheres.260 Norms percolate from the national to the international level and vice versa.261
National norms can be seeds of global norms, and states can
champion certain norms in the international arena and support
their wider acceptance.262 Conversely, international norms exert
influence on the national level, and research shows that national
leadership is often influenced by the normative judgments of
the international community.263
In international law scholarship, the term “norm” is often
used synonymously with “law.”264 However, it is useful for this
Article’s objective of identifying potential paths to space traffic
governance as well as legal science in general to be able to recognize emerging norms before they become black letter law.
The dogmatic, legal dichotomy, where norms either exist as
binding law or are devoid of legal relevance, is an unhelpful
oversimplification. Rather, the gradual emergence and diffusion
of a norm often precedes and provides the scaffolding and structure of customary law formation.265
The distinction between norms and laws is easy to draw in domestic legal systems, where breaking norms might lead to furrowed brows while breaking laws has legal consequences from
fines to imprisonment. In international law, no such unequivocal distinction between law and norm can be easily drawn.266 Na258 For discussions of the relationship between international law and international norms, see THE POWER OF HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC CHANGE 1–2 (Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp & Kathryn Sikkink eds.,
1999); FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS 45, 46 (Steve
Smith et al. eds., 1989).
259 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 891.
260 Id. at 893.
261 Id. at 893–94.
262 Id.
263 See Scott N. Romaniuk & Francis Grice, Norm Evolution Theory and World
Politics, E-INT’L RELS. (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.e-ir.info/2018/11/15/normevolution-theory-and-world-politics/ [https://perma.cc/8XF4-KDY5].
264 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 916.
265 Id. at 901.
266 See KRATOCHWIL, supra note 258, at 189–90.
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tions cannot be put in prison and no world police with global
jurisdiction exists. Indeed, the lack of direct enforcement leads
some to question whether international law is law at all.267 However, to assert that international law is unenforceable or can be
ignored by states would be a mistake. Generally, states comply
with international, law but the extent of compliance and reason(s) for it are subject to longstanding scholarly debates.268
The three major rationalist explanations for state compliance
are (1) reciprocity (states comply because they want other states to
comply); (2) retaliation (states comply because they fear sanctions from other states); and (3) reputation (states comply because they care about their international reputation).269 It is
important to note here that none of these reasons for compliance by states require a sharp distinction between law and other
norms. For states, international legal norms exist on a scale
from the inviolate jus cogens to the merely suggestive power of
soft-law principles.270
Over time, the legal weight of norms can ebb or intensify, and
new norms can emerge. Most legal scholars accept the premise
that customary international law changes over time,271 and
much scholarly attention has been expended in pursuit of a
clear definition of when an international norm can be said to
have been elevated to binding customary law.272 However, the
discussions generally concern the thresholds or characteristics
in terms of opinio juris or state practice while the process of customary law’s emergence is not very well described in theory or practice.273 In other words, the focus has been on how to recognize a
customary international rule when you see it, rather than on the
steps preceding or leading up to the formation of a customary
rule. To find theoretical lenses suited to identifying nascent
267 Anthony D’Amato, Is International Law Really ‘Law’?, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1293,
1293 (1984).
268 See id. at passim.
269 ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 211 (2008).
270 Id. at 213–14.
271 W. Czaplinski & G. Danilenko, Conflicts of Norms in International Law, 21
NETH. Y.B. INT’L L. 4, 4–5 (E.A. Alkema et al. eds., 1990).
272 See Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 122–23, 222 n.664. Customary
international law is defined in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute as “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” ICJ Statute,
supra note 90, art. 38(1)(b).
273 See, e.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, supra note 148, at 118–21.
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norms as potential seeds of future customary traffic rules, we
look beyond legal science to the broader field of social science.
B.

THE THREE STAGES

OF

NORM EMERGENCE

The formation and maturation of a norm can be understood
as developing through the three stages—norm emergence, norm
cascade, and internalization—as presented by Finnemore and Sikkink in their influential 1998 paper regarding the dynamics of
international norms.274 According to the framework, the first
stage of the norm’s “life cycle” is characterized by the conscious
effort of “norm entrepreneurs” to persuade states to embrace a
new norm.275 In the second stage, the states that have adopted
the norm act as norm leaders championing the norm and applying pressure on other states to follow their lead in adopting the
norm.276 Finally, if the adoption of the norm reaches a critical
threshold among states, the norm becomes internalized as an
internationally accepted, uncontroversial, and unquestioned
standard of behavior.277 Importantly, the three-step process described in the model is not a deterministic, one-way path where
all norms march towards universality. Not all norm entrepreneurs succeed in fostering state support for their proposed
norm, and not all states championing new norms manage to elevate them to the level of general internalization by the international community.278
The concept of internalized norms overlaps with the legal
concept of customary norms, but they are not synonymous; their
origin in two different disciplines should be recalled.279 That
said, examples of internalized norms often coincide with customary norms.280 For example, Finnemore and Sikkink use the
prohibition against slavery and the immunity of medical personnel during war as instances of internalized norms,281 both of
which are enshrined in customary international law.282 The
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 895.
Id.
276 Id.
277 Id. at 904.
278 Id. at 895.
279 Id. at 913, 916.
280 Id. at 904–05.
281 Id. at 895.
282 Fritz Allhoff & K. Potts, Medical Immunity, International Law and Just War
Theory, 165 J. ROYAL ARMY MED. CORPS 256, 258 (2019); A. Yasmine Rassam, Contemporary Forms of Slavery and the Evolution of the Prohibition of Slavery and the Slave
Trade Under Customary International Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 303, 305–06 (1999).
274
275
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norm life cycle framework provides theoretical tools to work
with norm development as a process and allows for more nuance than the binary logic of the dogmatic approach to norms
in traditional legal science.283 The general theoretic integration
of the notions of customary law and internalized norms are beyond the scope of this Article. It is enough to assert that if informal rules of the road for orbit were to develop and approach
the stage of internalized norms, it would resemble a customary
traffic regime in effect.
C.

FRAMING

OF THE

ISSUE

OF

SPACE TRAFFIC

The critical first step of the norm-emergence process occurs
when norm entrepreneurs act to “call attention to issues or even
‘create’ issues by using language that names, interprets, and dramatizes them.”284 The framing of space traffic as an important
international issue is being advanced by potential norm entrepreneurs hailing from NGOs, industry, and academia.285 Competing but often overlapping framings are being used in the
discussions of increasing orbital traffic with different normative
connotations. The issue can be framed as, inter alia, a classic
“tragedy of the commons” situation,286 a commercial competition issue, a sustainability problem,287 a question of ancestral
and cultural heritage,288 or simply a matter of technical capacity
Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 895.
Id. at 897.
285 See, e.g., Darrell Etherington, Why Maxar CTO Walter Scott Thinks Now Is the
Time to Address the Orbital Traffic Boom, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 27, 2019, 11:03 AM),
https://social.techcrunch.com/2019/09/27/why-maxar-cto-walter-scott-thinksnow-is-the-time-to-address-the-orbital-traffic-boom/ [https://perma.cc/KD3KU6EY]; Theresa Hitchens, SIA Calls for Space Traffic Rules ASAP, BREAKING DEF.
(Sept. 24, 2020, 2:21 PM), https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/
2020/09/sia-calls-for-space-traffic-rules-asap/ [https://perma.cc/9ZYG-5VKU];
Jamie Morin, Four Steps to Global Management of Space Traffic, 567 NATURE 25,
25–26 (2019).
286 Sylvain Béal, Marc Deschamps & Hervé Moulin, Taxing Congestion of the
Space Commons, 177 ACTA ASTRONAUTICA 313, 314 (2020); SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD,
GOVERNING NEW FRONTIERS IN THE INFORMATION AGE: TOWARD CYBER PEACE 309
(2020).
287 Minoo Rathnasabapathy et al., Space Sustainability Rating: Designing a Composite Indicator to Incentivise Satellite Operators to Pursue Long-Term Sustainability of the
Space Environment, 71 INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL CONG. 1, 1–2 (2020).
288 Aparna Venkatesan, James Lowenthal, Parvathy Prem & Monica Vidaurri,
The Impact of Satellite Constellations on Space as an Ancestral Global Commons, 4 NATURE ASTRONOMY 1043, 1047 (2020).
283
284
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optimization.289 The framing of the issue at the early stages of
norm formation influences the potential solutions and rules
considered, and it sets the direction of the development of the
norm.290
One way to frame an issue is through the use of analogies.
Analogies play a central role in the formation and spread of a
norm.291 When actors face new issues with no applicable prior
established norms, analogies can serve to guide their behavior
and provide the scaffolding for a new norm.292 Finnemore and
Sikkink argue that norm entrepreneurs can influence which
analogies come to dominate and claim that the general adoption of an analogy in turn influences emerging norms.293 For
space traffic in general, the analogy of seafaring is ubiquitous,
but it is important to maintain that this is far from the only possible analogy, nor always the most appropriate one. It seems trivial to point out that space traffic is vastly different from the
traffic on Earth’s oceans, roads, or even airspace, but it is worth
pointing out so policymakers do not bring over norms and assumptions when contemplating the future rules of the road for
space traffic.294
The impact of framing on the shape of the future traffic regime can be illustrated with the example of the competing narratives of space traffic management and space traffic coordination.295
The term space traffic management connotes a system where
some authority can direct and manage traffic, much like the case
with airspace, where air traffic controllers oversee and direct
flights.296 In contrast, space traffic coordination is a framing
pointing to a system relying on decentralized coordination between actors, more akin to the rules sailors apply when ships
meet on the open sea.297 Norm entrepreneurs favoring one ap289 Stijn Lemmens & Francesca Letizia, Space Traffic Management through Environment Capacity, in HANDBOOK OF SPACE SECURITY: POLICIES, APPLICATIONS AND
PROGRAMS 845, 847 (2020).
290 See Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 897.
291 Robert Sugden, Spontaneous Order, 3 J. ECON. PERSPS. 85, 93–94 (1989).
292 Id.
293 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 908.
294 Admittedly, the danger of missing essential differences between these domains is more acute for legal scholars and policymakers compared to technical
experts whose work will often remind them how foreign an environment space
truly is.
295 Blount, supra note 14, at 2–3.
296 Id. at 3.
297 For a discussion of the normative implications of space traffic management
and space traffic coordination, see id. at 2–3. For a review of the historical devel-
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proach of regulation over another can strategically support the
corresponding framing.
D.

IDENTIFYING

THE

NORM—ENTREPRENEURS

Some policy areas have strong, institutionalized norm entrepreneurs who naturally champion norm development, such as
the Red Cross for humanitarian issues.298 Although no major international NGOs are dedicated specifically to space traffic management, several nonstate institutions are actively working to
develop space traffic norms, in addition to the state-sponsored
agencies and multilateral forums.299 For space traffic, much of
the impetus for international norm activism seems to originate
in academic and technical circles.300 Studies indicate that for
technically complex policy areas, transnational networks of scientific and technical experts often play a role in shaping policy.301 Spacefaring is a highly technical endeavor characterized
by high levels of international scientific cooperation.302 It therefore comes as no surprise that the scientific community seems a
likely source for norm entrepreneurs.
In addition to the scientific community, norm entrepreneurs
with strong domain knowledge can also hail from the commercial space sector. The commercial firms driving the innovation
and growth in the space sector are directly impacted by the
growing risk of collisions resulting from the absence of basic
opment of the concept, see Quentin Verspieren, Historical Evolution of the Concept
of Space Traffic Management Since 1932: The Need for a Change of Terminology, 56
SPACE POL’Y 1, 4 (2021).
298 ANNE PETERS, LUCY KOECHLIN & GRETTA FENNER ZINKERNAGEL, NON-STATE
ACTORS AS STANDARD SETTERS: FRAMING THE ISSUE IN AN INTERDISCIPLINARY FASHION 5 (Anne Peters et al. eds., 2009).
299 The Secure World Foundation is one NGO dedicated to space sustainability, including space traffic. See generally SECURE WORLD FOUND., https://
swfound.org/ [https://perma.cc/T8NP-PN76].
300 For example, the International Institute of Space Law, the International
Academy of Astronautics, and the International Astronautical Federation all have
working groups and committees dedicated to furthering the development of
space traffic management norms and standards. See Space Traffic Management Committee, INT’L ASTRONAUTICAL FED’N, https://www.iafastro.org/about/iaf-committees/technical-committees/space-traffic-management-committee.html [https://
perma.cc/M4H6-M4PF].
301 For an overview of studies on the dynamics of experts and epistemic communities and their role in shaping policy, see Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT’L ORG. 1, 11 (1992).
302 See, e.g., JAMES CLAY MOLTZ, CROWDED ORBITS: CONFLICT AND COOPERATION
IN SPACE 148–49 (2014).
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traffic norms in space.303 In another highly technical and commercially driven area, cyberspace, the strong private and commercial entities that drive the technological development in the
field have, to a large degree, been able to shape norms and governance structures.304 As described in Part V, private actors currently control and operate the majority of space assets and can
therefore influence norm development directly through their
actions. In addition, industry and NGOs stimulate norm development through participation in international conferences, industry initiatives, and standard-development bodies such as the
ISO.305 With initiatives such as the Space Safety Coalition,306 Net
Zero Space,307 and Space Sustainability Rating,308 nonstate actors are building the institutional infrastructure needed to push
proposed norms to the international level.309 It can be convincingly argued that a future space traffic management system is
more likely to emerge gradually from operators coordinating to
enhance safety rather than through a top-down application of
rules defined by states.310
Private actors, including commercial operators and academics, can, as norm entrepreneurs, lead users to plant the seeds of
future customary rules by pushing for specific rules of the road.
Even if they do not manage to push states to adopt specific rules,
private actors can increase the pressure on states to engage in
some form of governance. Not having or following rules may increasingly be seen as irresponsible behavior in space.
E.

STATES JOSTLING

TO

BE NORM LEADERS

IN

SPACE

If the norm entrepreneurs succeed in convincing a critical
mass of states to become norm leaders, the norm cascade kicks
in.311 In this second stage of the norm lifecycle, the norms become formalized in national and institutional policies and proSee id. at 114–16.
See Polanski, supra note 216, at 375–76.
305 ISO, supra note 51.
306 See Best Practices for the Sustainability of Space Operations, SPACE SAFETY COAL.,
https://spacesafety.org/ [https://perma.cc/HZV7-R4TG].
307 Net Zero Space, PARIS PEACE F., https://parispeaceforum.org/en/initiatives/
net-zero-space/ [https://perma.cc/373T-6Z8B].
308 Space Sustainability Rating, WORLD ECON. F., https://www.weforum.org/
projects/space-sustainability-rating/ [https://perma.cc/Q7VH-7FD9].
309 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 899–900.
310 Blount, supra note 14, at 6.
311 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 217, at 901.
303
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moted by the norm-leader states.312 Such a tipping point of state
support has not yet been met for any specific norms for orbital
rules of the road. However, the recent deluge of state declarations of the importance of norms in space and states’ eagerness
to proclaim themselves norm leaders313 seem to indicate that a
crystallization of norms could happen relatively rapidly. It is a
stated policy goal for several major space powers to champion
new norms for space.314
In conclusion, the pressure for space traffic norms is mounting internationally. Norm entrepreneurs from NGOs, the scientific community, and the commercial sector are pushing for
states to develop or commit to norms in space to ensure safety
and sustainability. A catastrophic collision or a crafty coalition of
norm entrepreneurs might push states over the threshold and
initiate a norm cascade leading to the global adoption of traffic
norms. However, a crucial missing component for such a cascade to happen is the formalization of norms upon which a
global accord could crystalize. Therefore, norm entrepreneurs
with sustainable traffic practices on their agenda would do well
to start developing and finding support for concrete and specific rules of the road. Correspondingly, legal scholars and practitioners seeking to identify emerging customary rules of the
road for space should observe framings and analogies pushed
forward by norm entrepreneurs.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In ten or fifteen years, we will likely have reasonably standardized rules of the road with high levels of compliance in the orbital domain, as they are a prerequisite for public and private
ambitions in space. To a future observer looking back after the
rules of the road are established, the trajectory of their emergence might look obvious and natural—be it through custom or
Id. at 902.
For example, U.S. Vice President Harris recently declared, “We must write
the new rules of [the] road. And we will lead by example.” Kamala Harris, Remarks by Vice President Harris on the Ongoing Work to Establish Norms in Space, WHITE
HOUSE (Apr. 18, 2022, 5:18 PM), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/
speeches-remarks/2022/04/18/remarks-by-vice-president-harris-on-the-ongoingwork-to-establish-norms-in-space/ [https://perma.cc/HQY6-HG75].
314 For example, the two European Commission initiatives explicitly tasked
with suggesting international guidelines for space traffic are SpaceWays and European Union Space Traffic Management. See generally SPACEWAYS, https://
spaceways-h2020.eu/ [https://perma.cc/5MUM-PY5J]; EUROPEAN UNION SPACE
TRAFFIC MGMT., https://eustm.eu/ [https://perma.cc/9JZE-B3LG].
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treaty. Today, we can only observe a great necessity for filling a
serious and urgent gap in space governance, and squint in an
attempt to distinguish the faint contours of future norms.
At present, the gap in global space governance seems unlikely
to be filled by a multilateral convention in time to avert traffic
chaos in LEO as the commercial and technological developments proceed at breakneck speed. Whether the unlikeliness of
an international treaty is explained as an effect of the current
strain in international relations or as a symptom of a general
crisis of multilateralism, it is worthwhile to contemplate alternative paths to international regulation.
As demonstrated here, customary international law has the
potential to provide the legal basis for rules of the road with
global reach, even if states fail to formally agree. Customary
rules would be based on repeated practice and would therefore
embody tried and tested practices. In highly technical areas,
such as coordination of space traffic, rules based on the common conduct of operators might be seen as both legitimate and
efficient. In the best-case scenario, the future customary rules of
the road would reflect a hardened best practice based on experienced operators’ technical knowledge. However, the LEO satellite industry is highly concentrated, with a few commercial
actors operating a large share of satellites.315 Therefore, the possibility of special interests of specific groups influencing norms
should be considered.
The private entities that increasingly dominate the space sector may contribute to the emergence of customary rules directly
by having their conduct attributed to their respective states. The
conduct of corporate space companies is thus relevant for gathering evidence for the emergence of customary rules of the road
in space. The theory of attributed lawmaking does not break
with the dogmatic approach to customary law. However, the
greater influence of private actors on international law implied
by the theory raises questions of legitimacy, and further work is
warranted to integrate the approach into the still largely Westphalian foundations of international law.
Traditional customary law scholarship focuses on the evidence of international norms as usus and opinio juris but struggles to explain why customary norms emerge or change over
time. By applying the lens of the norm’s life cycle, this Article
argues that informal norms championed by nonstate norm en315

See Wood, supra note 184.
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trepreneurs can become precursors of international customary
rules. An implication of understanding the path from norm
seed to international custom is that the initiative for shaping future international rules is not exclusive to states. Rather, local
and international nonstate actors play an important role in articulating and championing norms early in the life cycle. In the
space traffic area, there is pervasive support for the notion of
better governance, but few specific rules of the road norms are
being publicly discussed.316 This presents an opportunity for
NGOs, activist academics, and other nonstate actors to act as
norm entrepreneurs and influence the future traffic regime by
developing and proposing concrete rules of the road norms,
and then pushing them to the international community.
As orbital traffic issues are essentially about coordination, having rules in place might be more important than what exactly
the rules are. However, to get there, we need to start formulating the basic rules.317 Here is an opportunity for norm entrepreneurs to grasp and, by proposing concrete rules, to set the ball
rolling on the traffic rules to govern our continued expansion
into the cosmos.
A.

PERSPECTIVES BEYOND SPACE TRAFFIC

Although the analysis here is focused on space law and the
specific issue of space traffic regulation, the findings and questions raised reach beyond the space sector. The parallels to
other major global-governance issues facing the international
community abound. Arguably, the international community has
been unable to reach binding accords on several of the most
pressing global issues of our time, such as climate change and
internet governance.318
The argument that technological developments, such as better space domain awareness capabilities, can further the development of customary norms by making trends in practice more
visible can be extended beyond the issue of space traffic. Many
technological developments, from Earth observation satellites to
See Borowitz et al., supra note 72, § 2.
Examples of such principles could be that spacecraft performing active maneuvers should give way to spacecraft in stable orbit, or spacecraft with higher
mass have the right-of-way over spacecraft with lower mass. These are not proposed rules but merely examples of the type of basic rules of the road we need to
model after other traffic domains. See id. § 7; Michel & Bertrand, supra note 162,
§§ 3–4.4.
318 See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
316
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social media, potentially provide transparency and documentation that are useful as evidence of emerging norms. Everything
from warfare to forestry is now being documented with phones
and satellites, and the pronunciations of state officials are being
made available online in real time. This reduces the difficulty of
documenting state practices and opinio juris to identify emerging
customs across policy areas.
Customary international law might experience a renaissance,
as it presents a viable path to regulating global issues in a time
where multilateralism through formal treaties seems to have lost
some of its potency and momentum. Importantly, the different
sources of international law are not and have never been in
competition or mutually exclusive. Rather, the sources can complement each other to strengthen the general rule of law in the
international community.
The potential primacy of custom as the avenue to create binding law for current and future global-governance issues may require policymakers, NGOs, activists, academics, and others with
an interest in shaping international law to rethink their methods
for influencing lawmaking. Exploring alternative ways to create
binding international law is not giving up on multilateralism.
Rather, it is ensuring that all tools available to us are employed
in the difficult but essential task of building and maintaining a
world order based on the rule of law. It is not a symptom of the
fragmentation of global cooperation, it is about expanding the
possible ways of finding international accord on the most important issues facing our global community. Customary international law may increase in relevance in response to a morefragmented international community with weakened multilateral institutions. More scholarship is needed to understand the
role of international customs in regulating global issues resulting from rapid technological development and the roles that
private actors can play in shaping their emergence.

